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I. INTRODUCTION
The Vice President of Research and Development at ToyWorld has
left to become the Vice President of Research and Development at
ToyLand. ToyWorld and ToyLand are head-to-head competitors in the
toy industry. Because he had access to trade secret and confidential
information at ToyWorld, Mr. Vice President (Mr. VP) signed a
nondisclosure agreement with ToyWorld at the start of his employment,
but did not sign a noncompetition agreement. Having just learned of Mr.
VP's plans to join ToyLand, ToyWorld moves for a preliminary injunction
asking the court to prevent Mr. VP from working for ToyLand on the
theory that he knows so much of ToyWorld's trade secret and proprietary
information, that he cannot help but use that information in his new job
with Toyland, and that ToyWorld will suffer irreparable harm if he is not
enjoined.
Whether the judge finds in favor of ToyWorld and bars Mr. VP from
working for ToyLand, or permits Mr. VP to work for ToyLand and place
ToyWorld's trade secrets at risk will ultimately depend on a fact intensive
analysis within the legal framework of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
It will call into play a balancing of social policy: the right of the
employee to pursue employment of his choosing and earn a living versus
the right of the employer to protect its trade secret and proprietary
information.
Critics of the inevitable disclosure doctrine decry the inconsistency
with which courts rule on these cases, and the difficulty in predicting
case outcomes.' They contend that courts are left to "grapple with a
decidedly ... nebulous standard of 'inevitability."' Further, they claim
the doctrine undermines the employee's fundamental right to move freely
1. See, e.g., Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Protecting Employer Secrets and
the "Docxtne of Inevitable Disclosure" 600 PRACTISrNG L. INST. LMG. 367, 410 (1999) ("IT]he
appropriate role for the inevitability doctrine may be in buttressing a restrictive covenant.');
EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 E Supp. 2d 299,308-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
2. Earth Web, 71 E Supp. 2d at 311.
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and pursue his or her livelihood: "The freedom of employees to sell their
expertise to the highest and most congenial bidder is an important facet
of individual liberty."3
Ultimately, both the problem and solution here are about fairness:
fairness in the employer-employee relationship, fairness in the
application of the law, and fairness in providing protection from unfair
competition between competing employers. The crux of the opposition
to the doctrine, in whatever form articulated, is that it is not fair to enjoin
an individual from earning a living, especially when there is no
noncompetition agreement in place, and when the cases and outcomes
are inconsistent and unpredictable. Further, there is a judicial motivation
to safeguard vigorous competition and prevent companies gaining
competitive advantages through breaches of confidence, bad faith, or
other wrongful conduct on the part of the departing employee.
To this author, inevitable disclosure cases represent the epitome of
the delicate balancing act that judges struggle with each day. This Article
will use these cases as a case study to suggest a framework within which
decision makers may accomplish what others think impossible: fairness,
through consistency and predictability, in cases that by their nature are
fact intensive and can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.
This Article proposes a model that balances four factors: (1) the
presence of a restrictive agreement (such as nondisclosure or
noncompetition agreements); (2) the degree of competition between the
former employer and the new employer, as well as the similarity of roles
between the employee's former position and new position; (3) the extent
of the employee's knowledge of, and familiarity with, the trade secrets in
question; and (4) evidence of dishonesty or bad faith on the part of the
employee.
This Article makes the point that even in cases where there is no
noncompetition agreement, an injunction may issue on the theory of
inevitable disclosure. However, these injunctions should be rare
occurrences because several important factors must be present to permit
the balance to weigh in favor of granting the injunction. Part II
summarizes the relevant case law on inevitable disclosure. Part III
addresses the tensions posed by the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Part
IV explores the confidential nature of the employer-employee
relationship. Part V discusses noncompetition and nondisclosure
agreements in the workplace. Part VI provides relevant background on
trade secret law. Part VII introduces the implications of seeking
3. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 E Supp. 1477, 1484 (WD.N.C. 1995).
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injunctive relief in inevitable disclosure cases. The proposed model for
handling inevitable disclosure cases is presented in Part VIII, and a
summary checklist of the model follows in Part IX. Parts X and XI
discuss application of the model and generalizability of the model,
respectively. This Article concludes with Part XII.
II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
Many other articles on this topic contain summaries of the
inevitable disclosure cases.! Accordingly, they need not be reviewed
here. Rather, this section will discuss the seminal case on inevitable
disclosure, as well as a sampling of cases (including some of the most
recent cases on this topic) that demonstrate the inconsistencies that
plague the doctrine.
One author has identified four general approaches that courts have
taken in trying to decide inevitable disclosure cases. These include: (1) a
general, fact-intensive analysis; (2) a focus on the bad faith of the
employee, or the bad faith of the competitor or the competitor's intent;
(3) whether the ex-employee's new position requires technical or high-
tech skills; and (4) an objective look at the competition, or similarity of
positions analysis.' However, these approaches are by no means
standard, and courts vary widely in terms of the weight given to various
factors. Some courts grant an injunction without any mention at all of
whether the employee had signed either a noncompetition agreement or a
nondisclosure agreement.6  Other courts deny injunctions without
discussing what agreements existed between the employer and
4. See, e.g., Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 1, at 411-22 (containing multistate survey);
James J. Mulcahy & Joy M. Tassin, Note, Is PepsiCo the Choice of the Next Generation: The
Inevitable Disclosure Doctine and Its Place in New York Jurisprudence, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 233, 250-67 (2003); Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview ofIndividual States'Applicaton of
Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool, 55 SMU L. REV. 621, 626-49
(2002).
5. Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Dives: An Accession Law Approach to the
Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U.L. REv. 271, 285-99 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., No. CIV 3-91-630, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20406, at *1-*17 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991); see alsoTemco Metal Prods. v. GT Dev.
Corp., No. 99-755-KI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6305, at *2-*4, *10-*13 (D. Or. May 5, 2000)
(issuing injunction and discussing nondisclosure agreement between new employer and plaintiff,
but not whether a nondisclosure agreement existed between former employer and employee). The
Temco Metal court initially issued an injunction preventing the defendant from hiring the
employee in question, but later removed the injunction after the plaintiff had been given sufficient
time to protect its trade secrets. TerncoMet, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6305, at *3.
TUL. J TECH. & 1NTELL. PROP
employee.7 These examples further support this Article's premise that the
inevitable disclosure doctrine is applied inconsistently.
A. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond
The inevitable disclosure doctrine was given new life in 1995 in the
case of PepsiCo, Inc. v Redrond It is worth noting that prior to
PepsiCo, several courts applied theories that mirrored the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, albeit sometimes without the buzzwords that have
become commonplace since PepsiCo.9 However, it is PepsiCo that
deserves, and indeed has garnered, recognition for the contemporary
popularity or notoriety of the doctrine.
In PepsiCo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
enjoining William Redmond, Jr. (Redmond), a former employee of
PepsiCo, from divulging trade secrets in his new job with a competitor,
Quaker, and temporarily preventing him from assuming his duties with
Quaker.0
The Seventh Circuit noted that the facts of the case "lay against a
backdrop of fierce beverage-industry competition between Quaker and
PepsiCo, especially in 'sports drinks' and 'new age drinks.""' Quaker
marketed "Gatorade," the dominant sports drink brand." PepsiCo sold
"All Sport," in competition with Quaker's "Gatorade."" In 1994, Quaker
also purchased Snapple Beverage Corp.'
Redmond worked for PepsiCo for ten years.' He signed a
confidentiality agreement with PepsiCo, but not a noncompetition
agreement. 6 At the time he left PepsiCo, he was General Manager of
7. See CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 649 N.W2d. 808, 808-14 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002) (discussing nondisclosure agreement between plaintiff and new employer, but not between
plaintiff and employee); see also Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 941 F Supp. 98, 99-
101 (D. Minn. 1992) (discussing the plaintiff's failure to prove the existence of protectable trade
secrets and the likelihood the employee would disclose them, but not the existence of a
nondisclosure agreement between the plaintiff and the employee).
8. 54 F3d 1262, 1262-72 (7th Cir. 1995).
9. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 E2d 500, 500-05 (5th Cir. 1982);
Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232,232-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Nat'l
Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 31-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987).
10. See PepsiCo, 54 E3d at 1272.
11. Id at 1263-64 (footnotes omitted).
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PepsiCo's Northern California Business Unit, which had revenues of over
$500 million and represented twenty percent of PepsiCo's United States
profits." PepsiCo alleged that Redmond, through his senior position at
PepsiCo, gained access to information and trade secrets regarding
PepsiCo's "Strategic Plan,' "Annual Operating Plan" attack plans, and
innovations in PepsiCo's selling and delivery systems. 8
On November 16, 1994, PepsiCo sued Redmond and sought an
injunction against his acceptance of the Quaker position.9 In granting
the injunction, the district court placed great weight on Redmond's
untrustworthiness." It questioned his credibility for the following
reasons: Redmond made false statements to PepsiCo executives about
having accepted Quaker's offer; Redmond unconditionally accepted
the offer from Quaker yet he intended to negotiate for a higher position
with PepsiCo;" Redmond presented a sworn declaration describing a
Quaker business plan of which he knew nothing, and he appeared to have
lied about obtaining the information from his new supervisor at Quaker; 3
Redmond presented "widely varying" descriptions of his expected job
title and duties for Quaker;" and Redmond swore in an affidavit to the
court that his job performance could be influenced by confidential
PepsiCo information, while his supervisor at Quaker denied that could be
the case.25
In December 1994, the district court enjoined him from working for
Quaker until May 1995, and permanently enjoined him from using or
disclosing any of PepsiCo's trade secrets or confidential information.26
Although Redmond had not signed a noncompetition agreement, the
court relied on several factors in granting the injunction and found that
PepsiCo had established that Redmond possessed extensive PepsiCo
trade secrets." Redmond had not just general skills and knowledge, but
"particularized plans or processes developed by [PepsiCo] and disclosed
to him while the employer-employee relationship existed, which are
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1265-66.
19. Id. at 1265.
20. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94 C 6838, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437, at *15
(N.D. I1. Jan. 26, 1995).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at *16.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id. at *91-93.
27. SeePepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995).
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unknown to others in the industry and which give the employer an
advantage over his competitors.""
Because his new position at Quaker was so closely related to his
former position at PepsiCo, the court reasoned that "unless Redmond
possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize information, he would
necessarily be making decisions about Gatorade and Snapple by relying
on his knowledge of [PepsiCo's] trade secrets."'29 The court rejected
Quaker's argument that the information would be useless to it, and found
that "Quaker, unfairly armed with PepsiCo's plans, would be able to
anticipate its distribution, packaging, pricing and marketing moves....
In other words, PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one of
whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team
before the big game."'3
Finally, the court found that Redmond could not be trusted:3'
Redmond's lack of forthrightness on some occasions, and out and out lies
on others, in the period between the time he accepted the position with
defendant Quaker and when he informed plaintiff that he had accepted that
position leads the court to conclude that defendant Redmond could not be
trusted to act with the necessary sensitivity and good faith under the
circumstances in which the only practical verification that he was not using
plaintiff's secrets would be defendant Redmond's word to that effect."
The PepsiCo decision has become the seminal case on the inevitable
disclosure doctrine and has ignited much controversy, because it enjoined
an employee without a noncompetition agreement. Many feared that it
would provide a windfall for employers who could benefit from ex post
facto noncompetition agreements without having bargained for them.33
However, this has not been the case because many courts have found the
presence of valid and reasonable noncompetition agreements to be a key
factor in the decision to issue an injunction."
28. Id at 1269 (quoting AMP, Inc. v Fleischhacker, 823 E2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)).
29. Id
30. Id at 1270.
31. Id
32. Id
33. See Peter Huang, Comment, Prventing Post-PepsiCo Disaster A Proposal for
Refining the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 379,
389 (1999); Matthew K. Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition
Agreement Exists: Addtiona Guidance Needed 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 9, 39-49 (2000).
34. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Francavilla, 191 E Supp. 2d 270,274-75, 278-
80 (D. Conn. 2002); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F Supp. 624, 632-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1996);
Maxxirn Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 E Supp. 2d 773, 777, 780-83 (D. Tex. 1999). Although the
district court in Maxxhn found the noncompetition agreement in question to be invalid, it still
issued an injunction after the plaintiff presented other strong evidence to show it would be
irreparably harmed. Maxxhn, 51 F Supp. 2d at 788. The United States Court of Appeals for the
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B. Other Case Examples
Courts have used the doctrine in two primary ways. First, they have
used inevitable disclosure as a way of determining whether an existing
noncompetition agreement is reasonable." Second, as in PepsiCo, the
doctrine has been applied separately as a way to enjoin the threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets even without a noncompetition
agreement.' However, courts have never clearly defined "inevitable," but
have appeared to leave it to the facts of the particular case."
The cases decided after PepsiCo are similar in that virtually every
plaintiff cites PepsiCo as support for seeking its injunction, and generally
tries to present PepsiCo type facts to show the strength of its case.38
However, there are vast differences in outcomes depending on the facts
of each case and the jurisdiction in which it is decided. The courts vary
widely on the weight assigned to various factors present in these cases.
For instance, some courts treat the departing employee's bad faith as a
very important indicator of whether disclosure is likely.39 Other courts
have issued injunctions even upon finding that the former employee is
honest and forthright.' The following are a few additional illustrations.
Fifth Circuit later reversed in an unpublished opinion. Maxxim Med. v. Michelson, 182 F3d 915
(5th Cir. 1999).
35. See, e.g., Lumex, 919 F Supp. at 632-34. Inevitable disclosure is generally used in
helping to determine whether there would be irreparable harm for breach of a noncompetition
agreement. For instance, in Branson UlWasonics Corp. v Satman, 921 F Supp. 909, 913-14 (D.
Conn. 1996), the court found that a high degree of similarity between an employee's former and
current employer makes it likely that the former employer's trade secrets will be used and
disclosed by the employee, and thus it was necessary to enforce the noncompetition agreement to
protect against such disclosure.
36. See, e.g., Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1198
(Utah Dist. Ct. 1998); DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *2-
*3, *5-*6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
37. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 E3d at 1268; Novell, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1197-1218;
DoubleClick, 1997 WL 731413, at *5-*6; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d
667, 667-89 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 E Supp. 762, 762-68 (E.D. Mo.
1997); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 E Supp. 1443, 1443-65 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
38. See, e.g., Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, No. 37265, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 5035 1U, at *9
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), revi4 754 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Maxxinm 51 F Supp. 2d at
777-78; Merck, 941 E Supp. at 1457-58.
39. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 E3d 467,471-72 (1st Cir. 1995); Bendinger
v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W2d 468, 474 (Ark. 1999); DoubleClick, 1997 WL 731413,
at *6.
40. Se!, e.g., Lumex, 919 E Supp. at 624-27; Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 215
U.S.P.Q. 547, 551,559-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
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1. Merck& Co. v Lyon"
The defendant employee in this case had not signed a
noncompetition agreement, but he did sign a nondisclosure agreement.'
Unlike in PepsiCo, the court did not make bad faith a necessary element,
stating that "when the trade secret is clearly established and the
possibility of disclosure high and the value to the competitor great, an
injunction would issue even when there had been no bad faith or
underhanded dealing by the former employee or the competitor.'
However, the court found that misappropriation was likely and issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining the new employer and the employee
from discussing pricing for one year, and from discussing product line
extensions and product launch plans for two years."
2. DoubleClick, Inc. v Henderson"
Two employees were allegedly caught misappropriating trade
secrets from their former employer to help with plans to start their own
competing company." One of the employees had signed a noncompe-
tition agreement, but its application to the conduct in question was in
dispute.47  The other employee had not signed a noncompetition
agreement." Neither employee had signed an adequate nondisclosure
agreement with the entity that was the plaintiff in the case.9
The court granted the preliminary injunction based in part on the
evidence of actual misappropriation." It also found that because of the
key role the employees played with the former employer, it was unlikely
that they could "eradicate [the former employer's] secrets from [their]
mind"'5 ' Their actual misappropriation combined with their "cavalier
41. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
42. See id at 1454.
43. Id at 1460 (citing Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 485 (N.C. Ct. App.
1976)).
44. Id at 1464-65.
45. No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
46. Id at *3.
47. See id at *2.
48. Id.
49. See id at *4 n.2. The question of whether there was a valid nondisclosure agreement
in place was in dispute because the employees had signed nondisclosure agreements with a
predecessor company, but these did not appear to inure to the benefit of plaintiff. See id It was
clear, however, that they had not signed new nondisclosure agreements with plaintiff. See id The
court found that despite the absence of a nondisclosure agreement, the employees nevertheless
owed a duty not to divulge their employer's trade secrets. See id at *4 n.2, *6-*7.
50. Id at *8.
51. Id at "5.
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attitude" gave the court reason to believe that they would use the former
employer's trade secrets. 2 Therefore, the court enjoined the defendants
from starting any company or working for any company that competes
with their former employer for a period of six months."
3. BarillaAmerica, Inc. v Wrgnht
In this case, the employee was the plant manager at Barilla's pasta
manufacturer's production facility. He left to become plant manager at
a competitor's production facility after only four months at Barilla.5 He
had signed neither a noncompetition agreement nor a nondisclosure
agreement, although both had been given to him in his preemployment
packet.57  However, he did sign a form acknowledging that he had
received and reviewed the employee manual, which contained the
company's confidentiality policies.
As plant manager, the employee was exposed to a large amount of
proprietary information, including manufacturing and financial data.'
The testimony did not show that he necessarily remembered the trade
secret information "held in his head."6 However, there was physical
evidence of trade secret information that the employee took with him,
and several factors weighed against his credibility6 The court found that
a threat of disclosure did exist and granted the preliminary injunction. 2
52. Id. at *6.
53. See id at *8.
54. No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002).
55. Id at *2.
56. Id
57. Id. at *4-*5.
58. Id at *5.
59. Id at *5-*8.
60. Id. at *26.
61. See id. at *14-*16. Among the evidence considered by the court was the fact that
Wright initially did not reveal that he had two confidential CDs and two notebooks full of
confidential information, financial and otherwise, in his possession. He later turned the CDs over
to the court. See id There was also inconsistency in his statements regarding information he
knew and the whereabouts of certain items such as financial statements and another CD
containing highly sensitive trade secret information. See id at *31-*32. Also, when his desk was
searched after he left the plaintiff's company, the company found financial information from the
defendant's employer before he worked for the plaintiff, demonstrating his potential for bringing
information to another employer. Id at *32-*33.
62. Id. at *34-*36.
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4. Marietta Corp. v Fairhurst63
In this case, plaintiff Marietta, a provider of guest amenities in the
hospitality industry, brought suit to enjoin its former employee, a Senior
Vice-President of Sales and Marketing, from working for a competitor.'
The court found that he "was privy to a great deal of confidential
information in the course of his employment with plaintiff."5 As to the
employee's role at the new employer, the court stated that "there is
undeniably substantial overlap, particularly when each company's future
plans and intentions are considered." The employee worked for the
plaintiff from 1994 to 2002 and had previously signed an agreement with
an express covenant not to compete.67  However, when the
noncompetition agreement expired in 1999, the parties did not enter into
a new one." Instead, the employee signed a confidentiality agreement
only.6
9
The court granted plaintiff's request for an injunction for a period of
eleven months.' It found that it was "likely" that defendant would use
the trade secrets, "if only unconsciously.'7' Other than noting that the
defendant had contacted several of plaintiff's customers "to inform them
of his new affiliation and initiate a relationship on behalf of his new
employer,"72 there was no evidence of bad faith or dishonesty by the
departing employee.'
5. Rencor Controls, Inc. v Stinson"'
Plaintiff Rencor distributed valves for industrial applications."
"Rencor developed a unique computer program and database ...
containing customer, pricing, sales, product inventory, distribution, and
63. No. 37265, 2002 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50351U (N.Y Sup. Ct. Aug. 23, 2002), revc 754
N.YS.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
64. Id at*l.
65. Id at *6.
66. Id. at *12.
67. Id at *4.
68. Id Defendant attempted to amend the noncompetition agreement, proposing that the
employer provide him with a salary for the two year period after the noncompetition agreement
was terminated. Id at *5. The employer did not agree to do so. Id The court found that the
opportunity to negotiate for the noncompete covenant would not, of itself, preclude recovery for
plaintiff. Id at *13.
69. Id at *4.
70. Id at 18.
71. Id at *13.
72. Id at *5.
73. Id at *9.
74. 230 E Supp. 2d 99 (D. Me. 2002).
75. Id at 100.
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delivery information. 7  Defendant Stinson was an outside sales
representative for Rencor, and he was provided with Rencor's software
containing proprietary information." Defendant Ingram, an officer and
director of Rencor, left to form a competing company." Rencor
prevented Ingram from taking the proprietary software, but it soon
learned that Stinson had gone to work for Ingram as a sales
representative and still had the software on his laptop. 9 Stinson allegedly
used the program to enable Ingram's new company to underbid RencorY0
Rencor sought, among other things, to enjoin Stinson from working
for Ingram's companyY Rencor sought to "prevent the harm that
inevitably [would] arise if Mr. Stinson [were] permitted to take his
knowledge of Rencor's pricing architecture, which Mr. Stinson acquired
through his use of the Rencor Software, with him to [the competitor]."82
Stinson had not signed either a nondisclosure agreement or a
noncompetition agreement. 3 Because Stinson had returned the copy of
the software and information taken from Rencor, the court did not agree
that disclosure would be inevitable. " The court refused to enjoin Stinson
from working for the competitor."
6. Lawler Mfg. Co. v Bradley Corp.86
In this case, Lawler manufactured a thermostatic water mixing
valve and an emergency valve."7 The valves were designed and patented
by the defendant employee who assigned the patents to Lawler." The
employee subsequently went to work for a competitor."' Lawler soon
thereafter "discovered that hundreds of engineering drawings and
component parts were missing." The employee had signed neither a





80. Id at 101.
81. Id
82. Id at 102 (internal quotations omitted).
83. See id at 103 n.4. There is no discussion of either employee having signed a
nondisclosure agreement, so it can be assumed that one did not exist. See id at 99-104.
84. See id at 102.
85. Idat 104.
86. No. IP 98-1660-C M/S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14197 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 26,2000).
87. Id at *4.
88. Id at *6.
89. Id at *8.
90. Id
91. See id at *42.
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Lawler sought a preliminary injunction on an inevitable disclosure
claim three years after the employee left the company? The court denied
injunctive relief on plaintiff's trade secrets claim finding a small
likelihood of success on the merits, and especially finding that the
plaintiff's delay in seeking injunctive relief did not support its claim of
irreparable harm."
7. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v Lockhxait
Plaintiff Bridgestone/Firestone sought to enjoin a former vice
president of sales who left to join a competitor in its commercial roofing
products division." Seventy-five percent of Bridgestone/Firestone's
roofing business involved "residential" products." The court held that
the confidential marketing information, which the plaintiff claimed was a
trade secret, was likely to erode quickly?
The court also found that the threatened misappropriation failed to
rise to the level of "inevitability."'8 In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered several key facts: that the employee took no documents; the
employee and other former coworkers testified that even though they
once had knowledge of the employer's financial information, they could
no longer remember the information that was sensitive and claimed to be
a trade secret; the employee was not working on competing products;
valiant efforts were made by both the employee and his new employer to
ensure that disclosure would not take place; and an agreement was
reached between the new employer and the employee so that the
employee would not violate the terms of the noncompetition agreement
with the former employer."
Although the employee signed a noncompetition agreement, the
court held that it was "unreasonably broad and unenforceable."'" The
court did not grant the injunction.'
92. Se id at *40.
93 Se id at *44.
94. 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
95. Id. at 671.
96. Id at 670-71.
97. Id at 685.
98. See id at 682.
99. See id.
100. Id at 683.
101. Id at 689.
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C Confusion Between ThreatenedMisappropriation andInevitable
Disclosure
One prime example of the misunderstanding surrounding the
inevitable disclosure doctrine is that courts"2 and commentators appear
confused about whether threatened disclosure and inevitable disclosure
are the same theory or completely different theories."° The belief that the
two theories are separate and distinct is misplaced. Rather, a careful
review of the case law, particularly the leading case of PepsiCo makes
clear that inevitable disclosure is a way of establishing threatened
disclosure."
The Seventh Circuit in PepsiCo clearly recognized the tension
created when a plaintiff "sues to prevent not the actual misappropriation
of trade secrets but the mere threat that it will occur."'"° However, it noted
that the Illinois Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) allowed a court to
enjoin either the actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret,
and proceeded to analyze the case treating inevitable disclosure
interchangeably with threatened misappropriation."
More recent cases, however, sometimes treat inevitable disclosure
as if it were different from threatened disclosure, and thus held it to a
higher standard. One court's analysis in the Del Monte case serves to
illustrate the problem.'" In Del Monte, the defendant employee worked
for Del Monte as a senior scientist and one of its highest ranking
executives." 8 He left Del Monte after sixteen years to join Dole, a direct
competitor of Del Monte's.' Del Monte sought to enjoin the employee,
who had not signed a noncompetition agreement, from working for
Dole."0
102. See, e.g., Barilla Am., Inc. v. Wright, No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12773, at *29-*30 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148
E Supp. 2d 1326, 1337-38 (S.D. Fla. 2001); see alsoNovell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group
Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1218 (D. Utah 1998) (stating that the inevitable disclosure doctrine "is
used to show that the probability of a threatened injury or misappropriation is so high that it
becomes 'inevitable' ... [and thus] is not ... a separate basis for action, but rather is used to
establish the existence of threatened misappropriation").
103. See Miller, supra note 33, IN 2-3; James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret
Law, 70 TEMPLE L. REv. 1181, 1186 (1997).
104. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 E3d 1262, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
BaRilla; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773, at *27-*30.
105. PepsiCo, 54 F3d at 1268.
106. See id. at 1267-68.
107. 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1326-40.
108. Id at 1329.
109. Id. at 1329-32.
110. Id. at 1328-30.
TUL. I. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
The court took the position that threatened disclosure and inevitable
disclosure "are separate and distinct and that threatened disclosure
requires proof beyond inevitability.""' Interestingly, the opinion offers no
case law support for this position."' It appears that even the plaintiff put
forth inevitable disclosure and threatened disclosure as alternative
arguments, yet its argument for threatened misappropriation was
identical to its argument under the inevitable disclosure doctrine."3 It
may be that this was a purely strategic approach, since as the court found,
neither Florida nor California (which supplied the law of the case) have
adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine."'
Nevertheless, after deciding that the inevitable disclosure doctrine
could not afford relief to Del Monte in this case, the court's analysis of
whether there was threatened disclosure, or in its own words
"inevitability-plus," focused on the likelihood that the employee would
divulge Del Monte's trade secrets."5 The court considered, for instance,
that the employee took no documents or confidential information with
him when he left, that he could not remember any trade secrets with
precision, and that Dole, his new employer, had taken steps to ensure that
the employee would not divulge any of Del Monte's trade secrets in his
new role at Dole."6 Under the model presented in this Article, the court's
reasoning is no different from consideration of the evidence of bad faith
or dishonesty that would lead a court to believe the employee is likely to
disclose.' Accordingly, the inevitable disclosure versus threatened
disclosure dichotomy appears to be a distinction without a difference.
III. THE TENSIONS POSED IN INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE CASES
At their core, inevitable disclosure cases cut across many facets of
the employer-employee relationship and the social policies underlying
them. On one level, these cases are about the individual employee versus
the company employer. On another level, they are about employer versus
employer or competitor versus competitor. This second level appears to




114. Seeid. at 1336-37.
115. See id. at 1336, 1338-39. The court noted in passing that Del Monte "probably would
succeed on its inevitable disclosure theory" if the case were in a jurisdiction more favorable to the
doctrine. Id. at 1336.
116. Seeid.at 1339.
117. See infr' Part VIII.D (discussing bad faith).
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lies in the examination of the expectations and policies surrounding the
employer-employee relationship.
A. Freedom to Fire and Freedom to Leave?
The inevitable disclosure doctrine is controversial primarily because
it has the potential to upset the balance that courts have traditionally tried
to achieve in employment cases, and because, at its core, it appears to go
against a fundamental tenet of employment law: the at-will doctrine.
The employment at-will doctrine provides that an employee may be fired
at any time, for any reason, by his employer."'
It similarly follows that the employee may voluntarily leave his
employer at any time, or for any reason, to pursue a job of his choosing.
Critics contend that the inevitable disclosure doctrine undermines the
employee's fundamental right to move freely and pursue his livelihood."'
This freedom by both parties to do as each pleases is generally only
restricted when the parties specifically contract to do so. Thus, an
employee who agrees to work with an employer for a specified period of
time, or who agrees not to join a competitor after leaving the employer,
receives valuable consideration for agreeing to those restrictions.
B. Trade Secret Protection as Sword or Shield?
An employer has a strong interest in protecting its valuable trade
secrets, and trade secret theft continues to be a growing problem for
businesses.'20 Trade secret protection is often justified on the grounds
that it would be unfair for one party to become enriched at the expense of
another through theft of the latter's secrets.'2' Employers also rely on the
protections provided under trade secret law as an incentive to invest the
resources to create trade secrets, and to share those secrets with
employees.
118. See HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERvANT 272 (R.H.
Helmholz et al. eds., William S. Hein & Co. 1981) (1877).
119. See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 E Supp. 1477, 1482-83 (WD.N.C.
1995).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 5-6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4023-25.
121. See JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTrrERMAN, TRADE SECRErS PROTECTION AND
ExPLOITATION 12-13 (1998).
122. See id.; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINES 153 (4th ed. 1997).
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Courts have consistently recognized an employer's right to protect
and preserve trade secrets, confidential, and proprietary information."
An employer has a recognized business interest in protecting trade
secrets disclosed in confidence to an employee during the course of his
employment even where there is no enforceable restrictive covenant
between the parties." This is especially true where the employee was
placed in a position of trust and responsibility by the employer.'
Ultimately, it is intimate knowledge of a company's inner workings that is
of value to a competitor. That value to a competitor helps make the
information a trade secret, and "[a] trade secret once lost, is lost ...
forever."' 2 However, as one court notes:
[The] protection given to trade secrets is a shield, sanctioned by the courts,
for the preservation of trust in confidential relationships; it is not a sword to
be used by employers to retain employees by the threat of rendering them
substantially unemployable in the field of their experience should they
decide to resign.
Accordingly, careful consideration must be given to protecting trade
secrets in a way that does not unreasonably impinge on employees'
rights.
C General Knowledge or Specific Knowledge?
Another important tension presented in these types of cases is the
right of the employee to use the information that is in his head, versus an
employer's right to stake a claim to that information. A former employee
may use the general knowledge, skills, and experience acquired during
his employment, even in competition with his former employer.'28
However, the former employee may not use the confidential or trade
secret information of the former employer.' 9
It has long been established that a former employee may take
general knowledge with him to a new employer:
123. See, e.g., New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Mass.
1977); D.C. Wiring, Inc. v. Lamontagne, No. 91-1722, 1993 WL 818562, at *1-*2 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 1993); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 805 (R.I. 1909).
124. See, e.g., Stevens& Co., 71 A. at 805.
125. See D.C. Wiring, 1993 WL 818562, at *2 ("Courts have confirmed that businesses
may protect confidential information by means of a covenant not to compete?'); see also New
England Canteen Serv, 363 N.E.2d at 528 (holding that an employer's interest in trade secrets,
confidential data, and goodwill are entitled to protection).
126. FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
127. E.W Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 E2d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1969).
128. SeeRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995).
129. Seeid § 42 cmts. b-c.
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It is also "well settled that an employee upon terminating his employment
may carry away and use the general skill or knowledge acquired during the
course of the employment." This principle effectuates the public interest in
labor mobility, promotes the employee's freedom to practice a profession,
and freedom of competition."
. Competiton Fair or Unfair?
Aside from the employer-employee relationship, the general
interests of competitor employers must also enter the balance. One of the
goals of trade secret law is "the maintenance of standards of commercial
ethics."'3 ' Thus, while competition is a valued part of doing business, our
laws establish boundaries to ensure that this competition is not conducted
unfairly. Just as it would not be fair for a company to break into a
competitor's locked safe to steal its secret formula, it is also unfair to
misappropriate a competitor's trade secrets by hiring a former employee
who will disclose these secrets. Accordingly, courts must strike the
appropriate balance between anticompetitive conduct and trade secret
protection in inevitable disclosure.
Indeed, it appears to this author that the two levels (company to
company and employer to employee) become melded together in
inevitable disclosure cases, because the cases are really about the
competitive aspect, but with the employee caught in the middle as the
tool for the unfair competition. This marrying of unfair competition and
trade secret law may be a sign of things to come. Trade secret law has
already made its way from the Restatement of Torts to the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.' In addition, unfair competition claims
involving trade secrets often mirror trade secret misappropriation
claims.'33 For the purposes of this Article, this implies that any proposed
model must recognize this fusion, and take it into consideration in
building a workable model.'"'
130. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F2d 842, 852 (1st Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
131. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,481 (1974).
132. Seediscussion infra Part VI.C.
133. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., No. CIV 3-91-630, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20-406, at *11 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991); GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 151 F, Supp. 2d
1229, 1236 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
134. See discussion infia Part VIII.B.
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IV THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP
The general rule is that the employee stands in a confidential
relationship with his employer with respect to the employer's
confidences.' An employee's "duty not to disclose the secrets of [his]
employer may arise [from] either ... an express contract, or may be
implied from the confidential relationship existing between the employer
and employee," and an employee may not use this information to the
detriment of the employer.'36 The courts have been clear that this
protection applies to an employer's trade secrets even after the employee
no longer works for the employer.'37
Some courts view the employee's duty of confidentiality to the
employer as a fiduciary obligation. 8 While working for the employer,
the employee owes a duty of loyalty to the employer and accordingly,
must not behave in any manner that would be harmful to the employer.
39
There appears to be a limited exception, however, allowing an employee
to take certain steps to prepare to start a competing business, such as
obtaining business space, and meeting with professional advisers in
preparation for the new business."
135. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
(holding that a confidential relationship existed between the employee and his former employer).
136. BIEC Int'l, Inc. v. Global Steel Sewvs., Ltd., 791 E Supp. 489, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
see also Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
137. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 215 U.S.P.Q. 547, 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
("lAin ex-employer can reasonably rely upon the obligation of its employees not to disclose trade
secrets about which they obtained knowledge while working in a confidential relationship with
that employer?'); L.M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948)
("It is implied in every contract of employment that the employee will hold sacred any trade
secrets or other confidential information which he acquires in the course of his employment?').
138. See, e.g., Churchill Communications Corp. v. Demyanovich, 668 F Supp. 207, 211
(S.D.N.Y 1987) (remarking that even in the absence of a restrictive covenant an employee's use of
an employer's trade secrets can be enjoined since it violates a fiduciary duty owed to the
employer); Rubner v. Gursky, 21 N.YS.2d 558, 561 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that a fiduciary
duty not to disclose is implied in all employment contracts).
139. See Royal Carbo Corp. v. Flameguard, Inc., 645 N.YS.2d 18, 19 (N.Y App. Di
1996) (holding that a duty of loyalty was breached where employee surreptitiously organized
competing entity and utilized former employer's customer lists); RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 387 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to
act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency."); see also
EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY (Arnold H. Pedowitz et al. eds., 1995) (providing a comprehensive
state-by-state survey).
140. See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp. v. Boreen, 413 F2d 694, 700 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding
that merely "preparing" to compete while still in a party's employ does not violate any duty owed
to the employer); Mercer Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. Wilde, 920 F Supp. 219, 234 (D.D.C. 1996)
(making arrangements for office space, inquiring about benefit packages, investigating computer
[Vol. 7
2005] FAIRNESS AND THE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE 187
Thus, under common law, an employee is generally free to compete
with his prior employer or work for a competitor, as long as he does not
breach the duty of loyalty."' Section 396(b) of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency explains that unless otherwise agreed, an agent has no duty
not to compete with the principal, but
has a duty to the principal not to use or disclose to third persons, on his
own account or on the account of others, in competition with the principal
or to his injury, trade secrets, written lists or names, or other similar
confidential matters given to him only for the principal's use or acquired by
the agent in violation of duty. 
4 2
However, an agent is entitled to use general information of the
business that is in his head."43 In one case, the court made the following
distinction:
[The former employee] has a great deal of general skill and knowledge as
an engineer who has worked for 14 years in the area of lithium production.
That experience and his skills are "general" not in the sense that everyone
has them, but rather, in the sense that they are not specific to the techniques
and processes utilized by [the company]. [The former employee] is free to
sell those skills in the marketplace. The mere fact that [the former
employee] acquired some of these skills while working for [the company]
does not mean that he must work for [the company] or not work at all ....
The law and his contract only oblige [the former employee] to refrain from
disclosing confidential information particular to [the former employer's]
processes."
While an employer may protect its trade secrets, it does not have the
right to appropriate the ordinary experience and general knowledge of its
employees.' Individuals have a fundamental right to pursue the
occupation for which they are best trained.' 6 As one court has noted:
Our society is extremely mobile and our free economy is based upon
competition; one who has worked in a particular field cannot be compelled
systems, and meeting with accountants in preparation for competing business not a breach of
duty); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OFAGENCY § 393 cmt. e (1958).
141. See Canteen Vending Servs. v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 98-CV-0314E, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7589, at *5-*6 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 1998) (acknowledging that absent an express
agreement or misappropriation of trade secrets, an employee may compete with his former
employer after the termination of the employment relationship).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396.
143. See id
144. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F Supp. 1477, 1483 (WD.N.C. 1995).
145. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F Supp. 353, 356 (N.D.
I11. 1989).
146. See AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhaker, 823 E2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting ILG
Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393,396 (11. 1971)).
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to erase from his mind all of the general skills, knowledge and expertise
acquired through his experience.... Restraints cannot be lightly placed
upon an employee's right to compete in the arena of his greatest worth' 7
Accordingly, courts must be very careful to safeguard these rights
and to determine that the information on which the employer claims
protection does not usurp the employee's general knowledge.
V RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS/AGREEMENTS
Restrictive covenants enhance an employer's legitimate interests in
its trade secrets and other assets, such as goodwill. Courts recognize the
employer's need for such covenants to encourage investment, protect
innovation, and promote free competition."'4 Generally, carefully drafted
post-employment covenants require that the employee maintain secrecy,
refrain from soliciting customers or employees, and not engage in certain
competitive activities,' 9 In addition, the agreements typically contain
provisions recognizing that any breach of the employment agreement
would cause irreparable harm for which the company would have no
adequate remedy at law, and that in the event of any such breach the
company would have the right to seek an injunction.150
A. Confidentiali/Non disclosure Agreements
As a condition of employment, many employees, especially higher
level employees, generally sign agreements acknowledging that the
employment creates a relationship of confidence and trust with respect to
confidential information. Confidential information may be broadly
defined in these agreements to include trade secrets, processes, formulae,
data and know-how, discoveries, developments, designs, improvements,
inventions, techniques, marketing plans, strategies, forecasts, new
products, software, software documentation, unpublished financial
statements, budgets, projections, licenses, prices, costs, and customer and
147. Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 994 S.W2d 468, 475 (Ark. 1999) (emphasis
omitted, citation omitted) (citing AAIP, 823 F2d at 1202).
148. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, No. 98 CIV 4001 (JSM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9700, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1998) (enforcing restrictive covenant "to protect legitimate
business interest" of former employer); Applied Micro, Inc. v. SJI Fulfillment Inc., 941 F Supp.
750, 757-58 (N.D. 111. 1996) (enforcing noncompetition agreement designed to protect employer's
investment); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F Supp. 1310, 1335 (N.D. I1. 1990)
(granting injunction to "foster the development of new technology").
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supplier lists."' However, a confidentiality agreement cannot transform
information that is generally known into a trade secret.'
A typical nondisclosure agreement may contain language similar to
the following:
All Confidential Information 53 and rights relating to Confidential
Information shall be the sole property of the company. I will not disclose
to anyone outside the company or use for my own benefit or for the benefit
of others any Confidential Information either during or after my
employment without the company's prior written permission except as may
be necessary in the ordinary course of performing my duties as an
employee of the Company.
Upon the termination of my employment with the Company for any
reason, I will deliver to the Company all documents or other materials
relating to my work with the Company and will not take with me any of the
foregoing or any reproduction thereof or anything containing any, or
relating to any, Confidential Information.
14
Confidentiality agreements express in writing the common law
obligation of an employee to maintain the confidential nature of the
employer-employee relationship. On a more practical level,
confidentiality agreements are helpful for (1) delineating the
confidentiality expectations between the employer and employee,
(2) showing that the employer takes trade secret protection seriously, and
(3) demonstrating the employer's reasonable efforts to maintain the
secrecy of its confidential information."' Employees typically do not
need to provide additional consideration for nondisclosure agreements,
and unlike noncompetition agreements, there is generally little or no
hesitation to signing a nondisclosure agreement.
151, See, e.g., McFarland v. Brier, No. C.A. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at *3-*4 (R-.
Super. Ct. May 13, 1998), revUl on other grounds, 769 A.2d 605, 614 (R.I. 2001). Exceptions
usually apply to such Confidential Information that may have already been part of the public
domain at the time of disclosure to the employee. See id. at *5 (citations omitted).
152. See, e.g., Early, Ludwick & Sweeney, LLC v. Steele, CV 980409063S, 1998 WL
516156, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1998) ("Not all confidential information meets the
definition of trade secret."); Iroquois Indus. Corp. v. Popik, 415 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(holding that restrictive covenant alone did not create a protectable business interest in customer
list).
153. Confidential Information would be defined in the agreement. It would usually
include the kinds of information that the employer could claim as a protectable trade secret.
154. See, e.g., Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. McGinn, 233 E Supp. 2d 121, 123 (D. Mass.
2002); First Health Group Corp. v. Nat'l Prescription Adm'rs, Inc., 155 E Supp. 2d 194, 201-02
(M.D. Pa. 2001); Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F Supp. 2d 773, 783 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1999);
Lumex, Inc. v Highsmith, 919 E Supp. 624,626 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
155. See Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 1, at 389.
189
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B. Noncompetition Agreements
By entering into a noncompetition agreement, the employee usually
agrees that for a specified period of time after the end of his employment
not to work for any company that is a competitor of the employer. For
instance, typical language may include the following:
I agree that during the period of my employment by the Company I
will not, without the Company's prior express written consent, engage in
any employment, consulting or other business other than for the Company.
I agree that during the period of my employment by the Company,
and for a period of one year thereafter I will not, without the Company's
prior express written consent, engage in, have an interest in, be employed
by, or be in any way directly or indirectly connected with any business that
is in competition with the Company.'
However, such a covenant will generally be enforceable only if the
employer can show that (1) it is necessary to protect a legitimate interest
of the employer, (2) it is reasonably limited in duration, and (3) it is
reasonably limited in geographic scope.'
State law establishes the requirements for determining the validity
of noncompetition agreements. Many states recognize and enforce
noncompetition agreements as long as the restrictions are reasonable in
view of the totality of the circumstances, including the scope of
geographical, temporal, and competitive activity restrictions. ' Even in
these jurisdictions courts also appear to take into consideration the
financial hardship to the employee if the noncompetition agreement is
enforced."9 Some states prohibit the use of noncompetition agreements
156. See, e.g., Kempner Mobile Elecs. v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., No. 02-C-5403,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3512, at * 10-*12 (WD. Ill. Mar. 7,2003); United Rentals (N. Am.), Inc. v.
Keizer, 202 E Supp. 2d 727, 731-32 (WD. Mich. 2002); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F Supp. 2d
859,864-65 (N.D. 111. 2001); Lumex, 919 E Supp. at 626.
157. See, e.g., All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481,485 (Mass. 1974); Novelty Bias
Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d 374, 375-76 (Mass. 1961); New England Tree Expert Co.,
Inc. v. Russell, 28 N.E.2d 997, 999-1000 (Mass. 1940); Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 135 N.E. 568,
569-70 (Mass. 1922).
158. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co., No. 98 CIV 4001 (JSM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9700,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y July 1, 1998) (enforcing- six-month noncompetition covenant); Inflight
Newspapers, Inc. v. Magazines In-Flight, LLC, 990 F. Supp. 119, 135-40 (E.D.N.Y 1996)
(enforcing one-year restriction); Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, PC. v. Baggett, 498 S.E.2d 346, 354-55
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (enforcing two-year restriction).
159. Compare Trans-Clean Corp. v. Terrell, No. CV 9703480395, 1998 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 717, at * 17-*20 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1998) (refusing to enforce restriction
measured by sixty-mile radius from Stratford, Connecticut, where restriction prevented ex-
employee from supporting himself, his wife, and nine children), Kith DoubleClick, Inc. v.
Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *7 (N.Y Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) ("[A]part from
references to the fact that [defendants] are apparently the only bread winners in single-income
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entirely.'" Other states recognize these covenants under narrow and
specified circumstances.'
As with all contracts, a noncompetition agreement will not be
enforced without valid consideration, and the employee must receive
some benefit in exchange for the restriction. When an employee signs
such a covenant upon being hired, the promise of at-will employment
provides sufficient consideration." However, states are divided as to
whether a covenant not to compete imposed after the commencement of
at-will employment requires new and additional consideration."
VI. RELEVANT TRADE SECRET LAW
Over the years, states developed their own laws governing the
protection of trade secrets, which resulted in a lack of uniformity among
the states.'" In an effort to make the law of trade secrets more uniform,
the Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1939, set forth a widely
followed definition of trade secrets.65 However, the Restatement failed to
achieve harmony among the states, resulting in the drafting of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979.'" Since
then, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition was released and
reflects additional changes to the definition of trade secret. 7 All three of
these sources adopt a relative versus an absolute standard of secrecy. The
sources are described below.
families, defendants have done nothing to demonstrate what financial hardship they would suffer
if the injunction were imposed*").
160. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-
113(2) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (2001).
161. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50-15.52 (Vernon 2002) (providing
procedures and remedies in action to enforce); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.35 (West 2002) (allowing
reasonable contracts "that restrict or prohibit competition during or after the term of restrictive
covenants"); N.D. CENT. C. § 9-08-06 (2003) (allowing exceptions for restrictions on the sale of
good will and restrictive covenants in partnerships).
162. See, e.g., Geisinger Clinic v. DiCuccio, 606 A.2d 509, 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
appeal denied 637 A.2d 285 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1112 (1995) (enforcing
noncompetition covenant entered into at commencement of employment).
163. CompaxeLowry Computer Prods., Inc. v. Head, 984 F Supp. 1115 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(holding that approximately two years of continued employment was sufficient consideration),
with Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stella, 994 F Supp. 308, 314 n.I (E.D. Pa. 1998) (requiring
new consideration such as corresponding benefit or change of status).
164. See Harlan M. Blake, EmployeeAgreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
625-28 (1960) (discussing historical background of what constitutes a protectable trade secret).
165. SeeRESTATEMENT(FIRsT)oFTORTs § 757 cmt. b (1939).
166. SeeUNw.TRADE SEcRETSACr §§ 1-11 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990).
167. See RESTATEMENT (TiRD) OF UNFAm COMPETnON § 39 (1995).
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A. Restatement (First) of Torts
1. Definition of Trade Secret
The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as "any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.""' "It may be a formula for
a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving




The Restatement identified six factors generally used to determine
whether information is a trade secret, and these factors continue to
govern through the U.T.S.A.'7° The six factors are:
the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] business;
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in [the]
business;
the extent of measures taken... to guard the secrecy of the information;
the value of the information to [the business] and to [its] competitors;
the amount of effort or money expended by [the business] in developing
the information; and
the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.'
Other than the first factor, which essentially asks whether the
information is secret, no one factor is determinative, and each of the
factors must be weighed to determine whether a trade secret exists."2
168. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
169. Id
170. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 E2d 1076, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. demie4 479 U.S. 1103 (1987); Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 584-85 (Md.
App. 1991); Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W2d 773, 777-78 (Wis. 1989).
171. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. Examples of safeguards typically
employed by companies include (1) maintaining electronic card systems that limit access to and
within the facilities, (2) limiting access to confidential information to employees on a need-to-
know basis, (3) requiring the use of pass codes for computer access to confidential information,
(4) restricting access to visitors by requiring visitors to sign in and wear identification badges, and
(5) distributing hard copies of confidential information by means of tailored distribution lists to
select employees on a need-to-know basis. Se, e.g., Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat'l
Chem. Co., 87 F3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1996); Alagold Corp. v. Freeman, 20 F Supp. 2d 1305,
1315-16 (M.D. Ala. 1998), aff, 237 E3d 637 (11 th Cir. 2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 E Supp. 1231, 1253-54 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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3. Misappropriation
The use of improper means to procure another's trade secret, rather
than the mere copying of the trade secret, forms the basis for liability
under the Restatement (Fit." , Thus, it is the breach of one's duty of
good faith through "breach of contract, abuse of confidence, or
impropriety in the method of ascertaining the [trade] secret" that makes it
misappropriation.74 The Restatement specifically sets forth:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed
in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts
that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by
improper means or that the third person's disclosure of it was
otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret
and that its disclosure was made to him by mistakei'
The Restatement recognizes that "an injunction against future harm by
disclosure or adverse use" is an appropriate remedy.'76
B. Uniform Trade Secrets Act
In 1979, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' It
codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret protection and
was developed for three reasons: (1) to protect those with substantial
investments in technology, (2) to eliminate inconsistencies between
different states in interpreting trade secret law, and (3) because there were
few reported decisions on trade secret law in less populated states.'78 The
UTSA has been adopted in whole or in part by forty-four states and
172. See GALE R. PETERSON, TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN AN INFORMATION AGE 2.2(A),
at 2-23 (1997); see also IVS Hydro, Inc. v Robinson, Nos. 03-1827, 03-1898, 2004 WL 626828,
at *4-*6 (4th Cir. Mar. 31, 2004).
173. RESTATEMENT(FIRsT)OFTORTS § 757 cmt. a.
174. Id
175. Id. § 757.
176. Id § 757 crnt. e.
177. See Johanna L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual SlaveryZ" The Docine of Inevitable
Disclosure of Trade Secrets 26 GOLDEN GATE U L. REV. 717, 724 (1996).
178. See UNw. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434
(1990).
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Washington, D.C.'" The six states that have not enacted the UTSA are
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and
Wyoming.'" This movement toward the adoption of the UTSA by such a
large majority of states may have advantages for the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. However, as discussed below, the model presented here is an
important step for helping to achieve consistency. '
The UTSA defines a trade secret as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process, that: (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.'82
It is noteworthy that a trade secret may take many different forms
and is not limited to, for instance, a chemical formula that may
immediately come to mind when one thinks of a trade secret. Rather,
any kind of information may constitute a trade secret as long as it meets
the secrecy requirements. Some courts have found that confidential
business information, such as "customer lists, accounts receivable, sales
records, costs, pricing, [and] inventories" and customer information,
including "credit history, sales volume, prospective future business,
service relationships, special needs of customers, supplier lists, cost
179. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, at http://www.nccusl.org(Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsaasp (last visited
Aug. 30, 2004). Seven states adopted the original 1979 version of the UTSA. They are Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Washington. Thirty-eight other
states adopted the UTSA with the 1985 amendments. They are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Seeid
180. The UTSA is currently under consideration by the legislature in Massachusetts, New
York, and U.S. Virgin Islands. Id It was recently enacted in 2003 by the Pennsylvania legislature.
See S.152, 188th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) (codified at 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5301-08 (West 2004), 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West 2004)).
181. See 7f discussion Part VIII.
182. UNI. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). The UTSA
requires only reasonable efforts, not all conceivable efforts, to protect the confidentiality of trade
secrets. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 E2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987); see also
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 E Supp. 1231, 1253-54
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that a church made reasonable efforts under UTSA to protect secrecy
of religious documents, including: use of locked cabinets and safes, logging and identification of
materials, electronic sensors, alarms, photo identifications, security personnel, and confidentiality
agreements for all given access to materials).
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information, pricing policies and profitability" constitutes protected trade
secrets if it has not been disclosed and it is not generally known in the
trade.
8 3
Similarly, UTSA jurisdictions have found that unpublished pricing
information, secret contract terms, marketing strategies, and industry
studies are also protected trade secrets.'8 Some may fear that expansion
of trade secret protection to such "soft" areas as marketing and strategic
business planning under the inevitable disclosure doctrine could be
problematic. However, if we keep in mind the rigorous standard that
must be met in order to establish a trade secret, and assume as we must,
that judges will strictly observe these guidelines, this fear may be
misplaced. If the plaintiff can establish that its proprietary information is
a trade secret, it need not be a scientific formula to be protected. To hold
otherwise would ignore the realities of the current marketplace and place
employers at an unfair disadvantage.
The UTSA provides broader protection than the Restatement
because it does not require that a trade secret be in use to be protected,
and it protects negative information about research or a process that does
not work.'5 The UTSA also allows for injunctions against threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets.'86 However, "despite the wide adoption
183. McFarland v. Brier, No. C.A. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. May
13, 1998).
184. See PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F3d 1262, 1265-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding strategic
financial and marketing information protected trade secrets under UTSA); ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 728-30 (Ark. 2000) (recognizing that Tyson's business information
concerning production, marketing strategies, pricing programs and contract terms were
protectible trade secrets under UTSA, but refusing to grant such protection for failure to maintain
their secrecy).
185. UNF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § I (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (defining
misappropriation); see ROGER M. MILfRm, MiLGRim ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1997)
(discussing the UTSA). A negative trade secret is the knowledge of what not to do or what
doesn't work, a lesson learned from a certain process or research and development effort that
failed. SCC JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.02[3] (1997).
186. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1990).
Section 2 states:
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the
court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist,
but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time
in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived
from the misappropriation.
(b) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon
payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which
use could have been prohibited....
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be
compelled by court order.
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of the UTSA, section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts continues to
have interpretive force across the country in both" UTSA and non-UTSA
jurisdictions.'87
1. Misappropriation
In states that have adopted the UTSA, employers may protect
against both threatened misappropriation and actual misappropriation."
The UTSA defines "misappropriation," as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means;
or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;
or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew, or had reason to know,
that his knowledge of the trade secret was:
(1) derived from, or through, a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or,
(I11) derived from, or through, a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its
use; or
(C) before a material change of his position knew or had reason to
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.89
"Improper means" under the UTSA includes "theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.' 
Thus, any unauthorized taking, transferring, or use of a secret is
misappropriation under the UTSA.'9'
187. &e Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 1, at 381-82; see also Carolina Chem. Equip. Co.
v. Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 724 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no misappropriation under
UTSA since the information in question was not a trade secret under the common law definition
of the Restatement).
188. UNIF. TRADE SEcRETsAcr § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449.
189. Id § 1(2).
190. Id § 2(a).
191. Seeid § 1(2).
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2. Provision for Injunctive Relief
The UTSA further provides that either actual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined.9  Accordingly, in states that have
adopted the UTSA, a former employer need not show actual disclosure in
order to obtain an injunction under the inevitable disclosure doctrine.9
Rather, the existence of a real and present danger of disclosure is
enough.'" However, mere suspicion or apprehension of injury will not be
enough to constitute an actionable threat.9 Nor does the possibility of
disclosure, by itself, rise to the level of inevitability of disclosure.'
3. Benefit of/Need for the Model
Because of the UTSA's prohibition against threatened
misappropriation, it would seem that states that have adopted the UTSA
would have more favorable treatment of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
than those that have not. However, in keeping with the inconsistencies in
this area of the law, that is not the case. Some states that have adopted
the UTSA, like California, have rejected the inevitable disclosure
theory.'97 On the other hand, New York and New Jersey have not adopted
the UTSA, but they have adopted the doctrine.'8
192. Id § 2(a).
193. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 E 3d 1262, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Barilla Am. Inc. v. Wright, No. 4-12-CV-902 67, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773, at *28-*34 (S.D.
Iowa July 5, 2002) (issuing an injunction without proof of actual disclosure of confidential
information); Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 356 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (stating inevitable disclosure of trade secret information is equivalent to threatened
misappropriation under Illinois statute adopting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
194. Sle Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 E Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting
injunction with showing of threat of misappropriation); La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F Supp.
523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (granting injunction where there was threat of disclosure).
195. See Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 E Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn.
1992).
196. See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 E Supp. 1477, 1481 (WD.N.C.
1995) (stating that the "mere possibility of misappropriation" is insufficient grounds for
injunctive relief); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 E Supp. 645,
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966) ("A trade secret will not be protected by the extraordinary remedy of
injunction on mere suspicion or apprehension of injury. There must be a substantial threat of
impending injury.").
197. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 E Supp. 2d 1111, 1111-12
(N.D. Cal. 1999) ("The theory of 'inevitable disclosure' is not the law in California"); Computer
Scis. Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Nos. CV 98-1374-WMB (SHX) & CV 98-1440-
WMB (SHX), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21803, at *23, *50 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12 1999).
198. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 E Supp. 2d 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, No. 37265, 2002 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50351U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), rev'd,
754 N.YS.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). For New Jersey; see, for example, National Starch &
Chemical Corp. v. Parker Chemical Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
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The model presented herein for determining whether an injunction
should issue is consistent with the UTSA's attempt to achieve uniformity.
The UTSA provides a definition of trade secret and of-misappropriation
that ensures consistency among states that adopted the Act. However,
since the application of these definitions in the inevitable disclosure
context seems to have led to even greater inconsistencies, the model
serves the additional benefit of bolstering the aims of the UTSA.
C The Restatement of Unfair Competition
Instead of revising the trade secrets portion of the Restatement
(First) of Torts, the American Law Institute chose to omit the topic from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and include it in the Restatement of
Unfair Competition.'" In 1995, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition was released. It reflected the changes in the law since the
Restatement (First) of Torts, in particular the adoption of the UTSA by a
majority of states.
The authors apparently thought that trade secret analysis was more
properly analyzed under the law of unfair competition than tort law.2"
This is an interesting shift in the overall treatment of this area of the law
and it corresponds with the growing union of trade secret and unfair
competition issues becoming evident in the case law."'
1. Definition of Trade Secret
In a nutshell, this Restatement provides an expansive definition of
trade secret as something of value that is secret: "any information that
can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others." ' This definition, although different from that in
199. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
200. Although the precise reason for this change is not explicitly stated, perhaps it is
because trade secret law is inextricably tied to the values of our competitive marketplace. As the
authors note:
[T]he law of trade secrets ... reflects the accommodation of numerous interests,
including the trade secret owner's claim to protection against the defendant's bad faith
or improper conduct, the right of competitors and others to exploit information and
skills in the public domain, and the interest of the public in encouraging innovation and
in securing the benefits of vigorous competition.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON § 39 cmt. b; see Mulcahy & Tassin, supra note 4,
at 243.
201. See discussion supm Part III.D.
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39.
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the UTSA, was meant to be consistent with the UTSA" Indeed, section
39 of the Restatement (Third) makes clear that "[t]he concept of a trade
secret as defined in this Section is intended to be consistent with the
definition of 'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the Act "'2 °*
Interestingly, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Compettion did not incorporate the Restatement of Torts' six-factor test
for determining the existence of a trade secret." "However, even despite
this omission from the Restatement (Third), and its lack of written
presence in the UTSA[,] many courts continue to rely heavily on the six
factors for guidance.""
2. Misappropriation
Liability for misappropriation under the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition is nearly identical to that of the UTSA.2 °7 Subsection
(b) of the Restatement (Third) mirrors the rule adopted in the UTSA,
203. Id. § 39 cmt. b.
204. Id.
205. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT,
Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990) (noting that when the UTSA was drafted
the six factors provided under § 757 were "the most widely accepted rules of trade secret law").
206. Mulcahy & Tassin, supra note 4, at 244.
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETmON § 40. Under section 40,
Appropriation of Trade Secrets:
One is subject to liability for the appropriation of another's trade secret if:
(a) the actor acquires by means that are improper under the rule stated in § 43
information that the actor knows or has reason to know is the other's trade secret;
or
(b) the actor uses or discloses the other's trade secret without the other's consent and,
at the time of the use or disclosure,
(1) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade
secret that the actor acquired under circumstances creating a duty of
confidence owed by the actor to the other under the rule stated in § 41; or
(2) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade
secret that the actor acquired by means that are improper under the rule
stated in § 43; or
(3) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade
secret that the actor acquired from or through a person who acquired it by
means that are improper under the rule stated in § 43 or whose disclosure
of the trade secret constituted a breach of a duty of confidence owed to
the other under the rule stated in § 41; or
(4) the actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade
secret that the actor acquired through an accident or mistake, unless the
acquisition was the result of the other's failure to take reasonable
precautions to maintain the secrecy of the information.
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imposing liability for the acquisition of a trade secret by improper
means.
208
3. Provision for Injunctive Relief
Similar to the UTSA, the Restatement (Third) provides generally
that injunctive relief may be granted "to prevent a continuing or
threatened appropriation of another's trade secret. '  It further calls for
the court to make a "comparative appraisal of all the factors of the case"
to determine whether an injunction is appropriate.10 Unlike the UTSA
and Restatement of Torts, the Restatement (Third) provides a list of
primary factors to guide the court in crafting the appropriate relief."' It
includes the following factors:
a) the nature of the interest to be protected;
b) the nature and the extent of the appropriation;
c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other
remedies;
d) the relative harm likely to result to the legitimate interests of the
defendant if an injunction is granted and to the legitimate interests of
the plaintiff if an injunction is denied;
e) the interests of third persons and of the public;
f) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise
asserting its rights;
g) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff; and
h) the practicality of framing and enforcing the injunction.21 2
While a step in the right direction, these eight factors are themselves
vague and relatively general. They appear to focus on harm to, and
conduct by, the plaintiff, and the relative benefits of an injunction.
However, the sheer number of them, and the lack of specificity of each,
makes them of questionable usefulness to a court.
Finally, the Restatement (Third) also states that injunctive relief may
extend for as long as necessary to protect the plaintiff from harm of
misappropriation and to deprive the defendant of any benefit that may
ensue from the misappropriation.
208. Secid §40cmt.b.
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D The Economic Espionage Act
In 1996 Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
(EEA) which provides the first comprehensive criminal federal trade
secret law on trade secret theft and misappropriation.2"" The EEA
criminalizes "theft of trade secrets" and economic espionage for the
benefit of a foreign government, instrumentality or agent."' The Act
defines "trade secret" broadly, utilizing parts of the definitions provided
in the UTSA, Restatement (First) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competion.21 6 The EEA is unlikely to be used by federal
prosecutors to pursue inevitable disclosure cases because the Act requires
specific intent to misappropriate."'
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Employers seeking to enjoin former employees from joining a
competitor will generally first seek ex parte temporary restraining orders
(TRO), as allowable in their respective jurisdictions. The more
successful TROs, especially ex parte TROs, may not necessarily seek the
ultimate relief sought under a preliminary injunction. Rather, they may
simply seek an order that the defendant not destroy evidence or divulge
any confidential information to the competitor until a preliminary
injunction hearing is held. This serves as a strategic advantage of serving
the complaint with the TRO already in place.
A. The Temporary Restraining Order
Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
TRO may issue where it "clearly appears from specific facts ... that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party or [his] attorney can be heard in
opposition."" A TRO is warranted where a defendant who receives prior
notice of the request is likely to take advantage of the opportunity to
conceal or destroy evidence, and thereby impair prosecution of the
action. 19
214. 18U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839(2000).
215. Seid §§ 1831(a), 1832(b).
216. Seeid. § 1839.
217. Seeid. § 1832.
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
219. See In reVuitton et Fils S.A., 606 E2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing FED. R. CI. P.
65(b)); Ivy Mar Co., Inc. v. C.R. Seasons, Ltd., 907 E Supp. 547,553-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).
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B. The Preliminary Injunction Hearing
After a TRO hearing, or even without one, the litigation in
inevitable disclosure cases are processed through preliminary injunction
hearings. The party seeking the preliminary injunction order must
generally demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, (2) that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of injunctive relief, and (3) that the balance of harm weighs in
favor of the moving party.2"
C The Impact of the PreliminaryInjunction Standard
The fact that inevitable disclosure cases are handled via preliminary
injunction hearings is a significant factor that has been overlooked by
virtually all commentators on this subject. It is significant because the
preliminary injunction hearing serves as a filter that affects not only the
procedure of the case, but the manner in which the case is evaluated by
the court, and thus ultimately has a tremendous impact on the outcome.
1. Expedited Discovery
One of the important ways in which the process can affect the
outcome is through discovery. The parties in a preliminary injunction
case will generally agree to, or the judge will order, expedited discovery.
This usually means that discovery in a complex trade secret case will be
conducted in a very compressed time frame. For instance, it may take
only two weeks rather than the several months as may be provided under
a normal tracking order.
This is the time when the defendant asks the plaintiff to produce
evidence that (1) the information which it claims is confidential is
actually a trade secret and (2) that the employee actually had access to it.
Depending on the nature of the industry and the aggressiveness of the
parties, this could mean the exchange of thousands of pages of
documents and several depositions within a very short time frame. It
could also be a major turning point in the litigation because the employer
220. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 506 N.E.2d 140,
141-44 (Mass. 1987); Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983); see also
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981), cited in
Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 E2d 6, 12 (1st
Cir. 1981). In addition, some courts may, but need not, consider the public interest. See Hull,
506 N.E.2d at 144.
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may not be able to demonstrate through discovery that it actually took the
necessary precautions to earn trade secret protection.'"
While the various Restatements, state statutes, and the UTSA are
helpful in determining what may or may not be a trade secret, there is no
"exact" definition of a trade secret.22 The determination whether
specific information is a trade secret is generally a mixed question of law
and fact."' In many cases, this analysis alone can be the death of a case
where, for instance, the employer did not take sufficient steps to protect
its information.2" Accordingly, the fear that inevitable disclosure cases
are or will become easy to win is unwarranted.
Another concern, particularly for the plaintiff, is the protection of its
confidential information during the discovery process and the
litigation." Without reasonable safeguards to protect confidentiality,
trade secret litigation could be hindered. To that end, the parties may
agree to, or the court may order a protective order to protect the
information. 26 Depending on the arrangement, there may be varying
levels of protection, such as designating the information for "attorneys
eyes only," or ordering that it be sealed.' In some cases, the court could
also appoint a special master or disinterested expert to hear secret
information and report conclusions to the court 8
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Aside from the procedural hurdle that may befall the employer
through discovery, it must meet the high burden of demonstrating a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 9 For all intents and
purposes, it must show the inevitability of disclosure of its trade secrets.
A plaintiff not only must demonstrate the traditional criteria for obtaining
injunctive relief (i.e., a likelihood of success on the merits, the potential
221. See, e.g., Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 F Supp. 762, 767-68 (E.D. Mo. 1997)
(finding that employer did not take sufficient measures to guard the secrecy of its alleged trade
secret information).
222. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIrST) OFToRrS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
223. See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 E Supp. 852, 864 (N.D. Iowa 1997);
Econ. Roofing & Insulating v. Zumnaris, 538 N.W2d 641,648 (Iowa 1995).
224. See, e.g., Carboine, 990 E Supp. at 767-68; NewLeaf Designs, LLC v. BestBins
Corp., 168 E Supp. 2d 1039, 1043-44 (1). Minn. 2001); J.H. Wright & Assocs. v. Engerson, C.A.
No. 00-0906-RV-L 2000, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18138, at *22-*23 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 2,2000).
225. SeeEarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 E Supp. 2d 299, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
226. See Symonds v. Smith, No. CV487-084, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7873, at *13 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 25, 1987).
227. SeeCacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser& Co., 169 F3d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1999).
228. SeeNorris Mfg. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 315 E2d 633,634 (4th Cir. 1963).
229. SeeAm. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, 143 E3d 1407, 1410 (1 th Cir. 1978).
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for irreparable harm, and a balance of the equities in favor of the
plaintiff), but also must demonstrate that (1) it has valuable, proprietary,
confidential information that is the subject of reasonable measures to
preserve its secrecy (i.e., trade secrets); (2) the departing employee has
knowledge of at least one of its trade secrets; and (3) the departing
employee's new employment puts him in a position to exploit the trade
secret(s) to the detriment of the former employer.23
Given that the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction can
make or break the case, since it captures the ultimate relief sought by the
plaintiff, this substantial likelihood of success standard makes the
mountain that much steeper to climb for the employer. Accordingly,
fears that courts may take these cases too cavalierly or employers may
have an easy time obtaining injunctions in these cases are far from
accurate. Rather, the preliminary injunction process itself serves as a
stringent filter through which the cases are processed. The model
proposed in this Article must thus be overlaid over this process, and used
in conjunction with it to determine this prong of the preliminary
injunction standard.
3. Irreparable Harm
Irreparable harm is presumed where a trade secret may be
misappropriated.23' Furthermore, it is well recognized that "loss of trade
secrets is not measurable in money damages."232 However, several courts
have denied injunctions in inevitable disclosure cases, reasoning that
irreparable harm was not established.33 As the Earth Web court stated, "A
demonstration of irreparable harm is the 'single most important
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.' The mere
possibility of harm is not sufficient: the harm must be imminent and the
230. See e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F3d 467,469-70 (1st Cir. 1995); Earth Web,
71 F Supp. at 316 (denying an injunction on the basis that there was no imminent risk of
improper trade secrets disclosure, and noting that the inevitable disclosure doctrine, while viable,
"should be applied in only the rarest of cases" absent evidence of actual misappropriation).
231. See FMC v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 E2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A trade
secret, once lost is, of course, lost forever."); Williams v. Compressor Eng'g Corp., 704 S.W2d
469, 470 (Tex. App. 1986). However, some courts make the presumption only when there is a
strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. See Lawler Mfg. Co. v. Bradley Corp., No.
IP 98-1660-C M/S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14197, at *40 n.5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 26, 2000).
232. Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 E Supp. 909,913 (D. Conn. 1996).
233. See, e.g., Earth Web, 71 E Supp. 2d at 316-17; Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 299 E Supp.
2d 763, 776 (D. Mich. 2004); Drayton Enters., L.L.C. v. Dunker, No. A3-00-159, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 474, at *4 (D.N.D. Jan. 9, 2001) (holding that the failure of plaintiff to show irreparable
harm was one of the reasons why a preliminary injunction was inappropriate).
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movant must show it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if equitable relief
is denied '2"'
Inevitable disclosure claims may be based on future harm, but they
may not be based on speculative harm. Plaintiffs must be able to point to
actual, indeed inevitable, harm to succeed on an inevitable disclosure
claim. 5 "There must be an imminent threat of the allegedly harmful
disclosure" to justify an injunction.23"
4. Balance of the Harms
The model proposed herein would also be useful in determining
whether the balance of the harms favors the employer or the employee.
The balance of the harms analysis used by courts appears to call into
question the very policies at the heart of this doctrine-balancing the
right of the employer to protect its trade secrets with the right of the
employee to earn a living. 7 It is similar to the concept of "balancing"
that appears in the model proposed here, thus creating a synergy between
the preliminary injunction standard and the components of the model to
determine a fair outcome for the employer and employee.
Employers may argue that, given the presumption of irreparable
harm in trade secret misappropriation cases, the substantial harm to the
company if injunctive relief is not granted substantially outweighs any
harm that would flow to the former employee if the injunction is granted.
The potential harm to the company is absolute-without injunctive relief
it will face the significant loss of its trade secrets and confidential
information, giving the former employee and his or her new employer an
unfair advantage.238 This argument is stronger in cases where there is a
noncompetition agreement, because the employee was fully aware of the
234. Earth Web, 71 E Supp. 2d at 308 (citations omitted).
235. See Sprint Corp. v. Deangelo, 12 E Supp. 2d 1184, 1194 (D. Kan. 1998) ("The injury
complained of must be of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable
relief to prevent irreparable harm."); In re Rare Coin Galleries of Am., Inc., 862 E2d 896, 902 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("[S]peculation or unsubstantiated fears about what may happen in the future cannot
provide the basis for preliminary injunction").
236. Cont'l Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F2d 351, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1980); see
also Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 E Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) ("A trade
secret will not be protected by the extraordinary remedy of injunction on mere suspicion or
apprehension of injury. There must be a substantial threat of impending injury before an
injunction will issue' (quoting Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 E
Supp. 645,654 (E.D. Mich. 1966)).
237. SeeRKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 E Supp. 2d 859, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
238. Cf Colonize.com, Inc. v. Perlow, No: 03-CV-466, 2003 US. Dist. LEXIS 20021, at
*1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2003) (holding that employer had not established that without injunctive
relief it would suffer irreparable harm).
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consequences of breach.39 In such cases, the employee may need to
show extraordinary hardship would be caused by the enforcement of the
promise not to compete."0
Sometimes the former employer does notseek a total bar; rather, it
seeks only to prevent the former employee from working for the new
employer in a particular capacity. In such cases, the employer may argue
the harm to the employee would be even less, since he or she would be
able to earn a living for the chosen employer. The only harm to the
employee would be in doing that which the law requires anyway when
the employee signed the nondisclosure agreement. Thus, the harm to the
company would outweigh any potential harm to the employee.
5. The Public Interest
In cases where the employee signed a noncompetition agreement,
the argument that the public has a right to expect that valid agreements
will be enforced, takes center stage. Courts have long recognized that the
public interest is served by protecting an employer's trade secrets. They
have held that "where a confidential relationship has existed, out of
which one of the parties has derived information or secrets concerning
the other, equity fastens an obligation upon his conscience not to divulge
such knowledge, and enforces the obligation, when necessary, by
injunction." ' That argument can also be made where the employee has
signed a nondisclosure agreement.
There is another issue here that is not frequently raised, but is worth
mentioning. It is the potential concern that the extension of trade secret
protection in cases like these could impede the ability of antitrust laws to
maintain a free and competitive market. It stems back to the idea that
inevitable disclosure injunctions, in the absence of noncompetition
agreements, are an impermissible attempt to destroy competition. ' The
full ramifications of this argument are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, proper application of the model presented herein should make
239. See Cereva Networks, Inc. v. Lieto, No. CA 01 3835, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 435,
at *21 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 12,2001).
240. See, e.g., Marine Contractors Co. v. Harley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1974).
241. Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 805 (R.I. 1909).
242. See Dial Media, Inc. v. Schiff, 612 F Supp. 1483, 1489 (D.R.I. 1985) ("[I]n the
absence of trade secret abuse, misappropriation of good will, or other damage Plaintiff is simply
attempting to restrain competition which is in this instance an unreasonable restraint on trade.");
Steenhoven v. Coll. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 460 N.E.2d 973, 975 n.7 (Ind. App. Ct. 1984) ("[The
employer] seemingly seeks not to protect a trade secret, but rather, to prevent competition....
Insofar as [the employer] attempts to merely restrain [the defendant's] competition, we believe the
UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETs AcT to be an improper vehicle therefor.").
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this argument moot. If after a rigorous analysis a court finds that
inevitable disclosure is threatened, then it has the power by law to enjoin
such misappropriation. Any resulting "harm" to a competitor is no harm
at all because no law, whether trade secret or antitrust, permits the kind of
business practice whereby one acquires an unfair advantage by
misappropriating a competitor's intellectual property.
V11I THE PROPOSED MODEL-FACTORS TO BE WEIGHED
The challenge here is to address the complaint that the application
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is "fraught with hazards '3 In
particular, the fear is that the doctrine creates a noncompetition
agreement where one did not exist.2" Moreover, application of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine absent a noncompetition agreement leaves
courts without the parameters of a noncompetition agreement to test for
reasonableness, but with a "nebulous 'standard of inevitability.""'2
In order to address these problems, this Article proposes a structure
whereby the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is treated as
if it were a noncompetition agreement. Like a noncompetition
agreement, the inevitable disclosure doctrine can be a de facto restrictive
covenant, but without the safeguards necessary to protect employees.
Therefore, parameters should be created to determine reasonableness.
When these parameters are applied uniformly, the decision of whether to
issue an injunction should be fair and consistent.
Despite the wide-ranging fact patterns presented in these types of
cases, there are certain criteria by which the facts of each case should be
evaluated. This Article proposes four factors that should serve as a
balancing test for determining whether a preliminary injunction should
issue in a given case. Each factor is necessary and important to the
totality analysis, but no one factor is determinative.
A. Presence of an Agreement
The first step in the model calls for an examination of any
restrictive covenants between the employer and employee. It requires at a
minimum a nondisclosure agreement with the employee. A valid
243. EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F Supp. 2d 299,310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
244. See Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn.
1992) ("A claim of trade secret misappropriation should not act as an ex post facto covenant to
compete?' (citing Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 E2d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1969)).
245. SevEarthWeb,71 F.Supp. 2dat311.
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noncompetition agreement, on the other hand, is preferred but not
required. The reason for this distinction is discussed below.
1. A Nondisclosure Agreement
In order to seek an injunction on inevitable disclosure, this model
requires that the employee must have signed a nondisclosure agreement.
Indeed a review of the cases revealed only one case where the court
granted an injunction without a nondisclosure agreement. " These
agreements tend to be part of most employment contracts or manuals,
and an employer should be hard pressed to justify a circumstance under
which it should have but did not obtain a nondisclosure agreement.
Further, unlike noncompetition agreements, employees tend to be more
willing to sign nondisclosure agreements, since they are not perceived as
being overly restrictive.
Since, however, the common law imposes some confidential
obligations between an employer and employee, it may seem unfair to
require a nondisclosure agreement from the employer. 7 Arguably, these
agreements merely codify the employee's already existing common law
obligations. Nevertheless, given the drastic nature of the remedy sought
in inevitable disclosure cases, fairness also seems to dictate that at the
very least, the employee must have signed and acknowledged these
obligations in writing. An employer claiming to have protectable trade
secrets, but careless enough not to obtain a relatively obscure
nondisclosure agreement, should not be heard to complain that it is
unfairly disadvantaged by not being entitled to injunctive relief. Indeed,
the nondisclosure agreement would have laid out injunctive relief as a
remedy for breach of the nondisclosure agreement.
2. A Noncompetition Agreement
The presence of a noncompetition agreement is key, but not
determinative. Where an employer has obtained a valid and enforceable
noncompetition agreement, this should weigh heavily in favor of
enjoining the employee from joining a competitor. 8 Indeed, courts
246. See DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *4 n.2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7 1997); cf Rencor Controls v. Stinson, 230 E Supp. 2d 99, 99-104 (D. Me.
2002) (denying injunction where there was no mention of a nondisclosure agreement in the
opinion); Lawler Mfg. v. Bradley Corp., No. IT 98-1660-C MIS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14197, at
*1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 26,2000) (same).
247. See discussion supra Part IV
248. SeeCont'l Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 E Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976) ("The non-
competition covenant adds something to the protection available to the employer beyond what he
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appear more willing to grant injunctive relief based on inevitable
disclosure if the former employee signed a noncompetition agreement."9
The parties have contracted for their arrangement, and the employee
should have foreseen, and indeed expected, that his mobility would be
impinged.2 e' In practice, however, one would expect that the cases with
noncompetition agreements would not be as dependent on the inevitable
disclosure doctrine for the outcome of the case (unless, perhaps there is a
challenge to the validity of the agreement)." '
It should not be necessary that an employer require an employee to
sign a noncompetition agreement in order to protect its trade secrets from
inevitable disclosure.252 Many jurisdictions do not favor noncompetition
covenants because of the concern that they effectively prevent employees
from earning a living.2' Accordingly, they are generally subject to
stringent review requirements before a court will enforce such a
covenant. For instance, the employer "must have a valid interest to
protect[,] the geographical restriction must not be overly broad[, and the]
time limit" imposed must be reasonable."
Where there is no noncompetition agreement, the case should be
viewed in a very different light. Indeed, there have been very few
reported decisions applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine where no
noncompetition agreement was in place. 5 Only three cases actually
would expect from the normal incidents of the employer-employee relationship or from a secrecy
agreement"').
249. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Francavilla, 191 E Supp. 2d 270, 274 (D.
Conn. 2002); Maxxim Med. v. Michelson Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 777 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Lumex
Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F Supp. 631,624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
250. As far back as 1929, Judge Learned Hand stated:
[I]t has never been thought actionable to take away another's employee, when the
defendant wants to use him in his own business, however much the plaintiff may suffer.
It is difficult to see how servants could get the full value of their services on any other
terms; time creates no prescriptive right in other men's labor. If an employer expects so
much, he must secure it by contract.
Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 E2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1929).
251. See Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 E Supp. 762, 768 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Int'l Paper Co.
v. Suwyn, 966 E Supp. 246,256-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
252. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 E3d 1271, 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); FMC Corp.
v. Varco, Int'l, Inc., 677 F2d 500, 500 (5th Cir. 1982); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F Supp. 1443,
1446-55, 1464-65 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Chem-Trend Inc. v. McCarthy, 780 F. Supp. 458, 458-59
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
253. See, e.g., Drs. Blum, Newman, Blackstock & Assocs., Optometrist, PC. v. Jessee, 42
Va. Cir. 187, 187 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (noting that "[c]ontracts that prevent a person from earning a
living are looked upon with disfavor").
254. See, e.g., Duffher v. Alberty, 718 S.W2d 111, 112 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Rebsamen Ins. v. Milton, 600 S.W2d 441 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980)).
255. See PepsiCo, 54 F 3d at 1269; Merck, 941 F Supp. at 1460-61; DoubleClick Inc. v.
Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *4 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
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granted the injunction without a noncompetition agreement."6 Many
would espouse that the case not be permitted to proceed or that the
inquiry end at this juncture."7 However, this author believes that there
are cases, like PepsiCo for instance, where the totality of the
circumstances would still weigh in favor of an injunction.58 Thus, the
other three factors should still be evaluated.
B. Degree of Competition and Similatity ofRoles
The second factor to be considered is the degree of competition
between the former employer and the new employer, as well as the
similarity of the roles between the employee's former position and new
position. Are the employers direct competitors providing the same or
very similar products or services? Is the employee's new position so
similar to his old one that he could not reasonably be expected to fulfill
his new job responsibilities without utilizing the trade secrets of his
former employer?
Where the companies are fierce, head-to-head competitors, the
balance tips toward the issuance of an injunction. Where, however, the
level of competitiveness is not as strong, such as when the companies are
not in the same industry, or compete for a different market segment, an
injunction should probably not issue in the absence of other compelling
factors.
259
In Earth Web, the court was presented with a situation where the
alleged competitor's business was not yet in operation. 2  The former
employee was Vice-President of an information technology Web site at
EarthWeb. 26' EarthWeb sued the defendant employee seeking a
preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the defendant from
pursuing employment with plaintiff's competitor.62
256. See PepsiCo, 54 E3d at 1262; Merck, 941 F Supp. at 1443; DoubleClick, 1997 WL
731413, at *8.
257. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Sheinfeld, supra note 1, at 410 ("[T]he appropriate role for the inevitability doctrine may be in
buttressing a restrictive covenant?').
258. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 215 U.S.P.Q. 547, 552, 559 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (enjoining disclosure of trade secrets and also prohibiting ex-employee undertaking certain
engineering assignments where the new employer had tried unsuccessfully to develop aspect of
business that employee could provide); Merck, 941 F Supp. at 1464-65 (issuing injunction based
upon inevitability of disclosure, despite absence of noncompetition agreement).
259. See Earth Web, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 299, 302-08, 317.
260. See id. at 302-08.
261. Id at 303.
262. Id at 302.
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The court was unable to assess the degree of competitiveness
because the new employer had not begun business as of the time of the
litigation."3 Although the companies would both be covering similar
areas of the information technology industry, the court considered it "a
nascent industry which is evolving and re-inventing itself with
breathtaking speed.' 2  It reasoned that EarthWeb sought to prohibit
competition not because of a prejudicial effect arising out of defendant's
knowledge of plaintiff's trade secrets, but rather simply to inhibit
competition."' It denied the injunction.
Having determined that the companies are competitors, the court
should then examine the similarity of the positions, and not merely the
job titles. An employee who will assume an almost identical role with a
competitor as she occupied with the former employer should receive a
more critical eye than one who will not.' The argument here is that
misappropriation is threatened not because the employee intends to steal
the former employer's trade secrets, but rather because he or she cannot
avoid such misappropriation in performing his or her responsibilities.
In Continental Group, Inc. v Kn sley, the court found it enough that
the new employer's work was sufficiently similar to that of the old
employer to make likely the risk of disclosure by the employee in the
course of his subsequent employment.26 "The mere rendition of the
service along the lines of [the former employee's] training would almost
necessarily impart such knowledge [as he had acquired from the first
employer] to some degree." 8 It found that
[Where the two companies were] endeavoring to develop the
identical product, a plastic bottle for carbonated beverages ... whatever
variation there may be in techniques, there is a high risk that in the course
of working with the [new employer's] process, [the former employee] will,
perhaps inadvertently, disclose secret aspects of [the former employer's]
process. Some feature of the [new employer's] process may prompt him to
compare it favorably with a less satisfactory aspect of the [former
263. Seeid at 305-06.
264. Id at 306.
265. Seeid at316.
266. See Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 E Supp. 909, 913-14 (D. Conn.
1996) (entering injunction where "high degree of similarity" between current and prior
employment made it likely that disclosure and use of trade secrets would occur); Emery Indus.,
Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.PQ. 829, 834 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (granting injunction where "transfer of
employment is to a head-to-head competitor and the responsibilities in the employments are
comparable").
267. Cont'l Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 E Supp. 838,845 (D. Conn. 1976).
268. Id (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 179 N.Y.S. 325, 330 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1919)).
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employer's] process, or vice versa. It is not difficult to imagine numerous
opportunities for such inadvertent disclosure.2 69
The court also found that, apart from specific secrets concerning its
process, the former employer is entitled to protect information about its
product development stage.27°
With a small number of companies competing vigorously to be
among the first to develop a new product with potentially enormous
sales, information concerning one company's proximity to success would
have considerable value to competitors faced with important decisions as
to the rate at which their own development should proceed. 7'
However, the mere fact that an individual assumed a similar
position with a competitor does not, without more, make it inevitable that
he will disclose the former employer's trade secrets." In Campbell Soup
Co. v Giles, the court refused to enjoin the former employee from
working for a chief competitor finding only "minimal room for
competitive maneuvering."273
As discussed in Part III, an underlying theme of inevitable
disclosure cases is unfair competition. Indeed, employees are sometimes
caught in the middle. They are perceived as the tool for the unfair
competition between competitor employers. Accordingly, aside from the
obvious consideration of the level of competition between the two
companies involved, this model recognizes and incorporates the blending
of trade secret misappropriation with unfair competition.27
C Extent ofKnowledge andExposure
Third, the extent of the employee's knowledge of and familiarity




272. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F 3d 1268, 1262-69 (7th Cir. 1995); s also Int'l
Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 E Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) ("Merely
possessing trade secrets and holding a comparable position with a competitor does not justify an
injunction').
273. Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 E3d 467, 471 (1st Cir. 1995).
274. The model is a mix of company level (unfair competition element) and employee
level (inevitable disclosure element) considerations. In particular, the degree of competition/
similarity of roles factor is a consideration at the company level (competition) and the individual
employee level (similarity of roles). The presence of any agreement concerns the employee and
the employer's right to restrain him. The employee's familiarity and exposure to the former
employer's trade secrets focuses on what the employee knows and can contribute to the new
employer or use to cause damage to the former employer. Finally, the bad faith analysis, although
mostly about the individual employee's intentions and conduct, also includes a consideration of
the new employer's participation and efforts.
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Implicit in this criterion is the analysis of whether the information is
indeed a trade secret. The employer should have clearly identified the
trade secrets at risk.2" General allegations of the existence of trade secret
information and general claims of secrecy of broad categories of
information are insufficient to show that a trade secret exists.276
The long-time employee who was intimately involved with
developing a product line and was privy to highly confidential business
information should be held in a different light than one who was only
with the company for a short period, and may have occasionally seen
confidential data or participated in meetings where confidential
information was exchanged. While the former is more likely to have
valuable information in his head and present a greater risk to the former
employer, the latter would generally not pose such a risk.
1. Is the Knowledge Specific or General?
Where an employee has worked in an industry for a long time, it
can be difficult to differentiate between an employee's general
knowledge, and the employer's trade secret information. 7 As one court
stated:
Mere "knowledge of the intricacies of a [former employer's] business
operation" does not constitute a protectable secret that would justify
prohibiting the employee from "utilizing his knowledge and talents in this
area. A contrary holding ... would make those in charge of operations or
specialists in certain aspects of an enterprise virtual hostages of their
employers?
278
However, in treading this delicate balance, the court must determine
whether the employee's main value to the new employer lies in his
knowledge of the competitor's trade secrets, or whether it lies in the
employee's vast array of general knowledge and experience gained from
educational training and years of working in the industry.
275. See related discussion supra Part VII.C. 1.
276. SeeAMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 E2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987); IntlBus. Mach.,
941 F Supp. at 100-01 ("Indeed, an injunction is inappropriate if plaintiff fails 'to identify
specific trade secrets and instead produces long lists of general areas of information which
contain unidentified trade secrets."' (quoting AMP, 823 E2d at 1203)).
277. See, e.g., Briskin v. All Season Servs., Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (refusing to enjoin "knowledgeable and experienced sales representative" who did not
know trade secrets).
278. Int'l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 E Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Reed
Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E. 2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1976) (alteration in original)).
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2. Is It Inevitable That the Employee Will Disclose the Specific
Knowledge?
While the employer must demonstrate that the former employee has
specific knowledge of its trade secrets, it must also show that it is
inevitable that such knowledge will actually be used. 9 In Marcam Corp.
v Orchard, the court issued a preliminary injunction and reasoned as
follows:
[The defendant] has knowledge of [plaintiff's] marketing strategies and its
plans for future development. Even if [the defendant] thinks he is keeping
[plaintiff's] secrets, he will, as [the competitor's employee] inevitably, even
if inadvertently, be influenced by the knowledge he possesses of all aspects
of [plaintiff's] development efforts. That knowledge will provide an
advantage to [the competitor] as it contemplates its own strategies
regarding future development of products that compete with [plaintiff's]
products.
280
However, the mere fact that an employee has knowledge of an
employer's trade secrets, does not mean that he will inevitably disclose
those secrets. As one court reasoned,
[T]he mere existence of particularized knowledge cannot render future
misappropriation inevitable. Such a rule would undermine the maxim that
[the UTSA] "should not prevent workers from pursuing their livelihoods
when they leave their current positions:' While the facts of this case
suggest that [the former employee] holds particularized knowledge about
[the former employer's] manufacturing and marketing operations and
should be enjoined from divulging that information in the future, the court
finds that this is not a case where future misappropriation is inevitable.8'
D Evidence ofDishonesty or BadFaith
Finally, by the time inevitable disclosure cases reach litigation, the
defendant employee will usually give assurances to the court and to the
former employer that he or she will not disclose any trade secret
279. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Intoccia, No. 94-11568-Z, 1994 WL 601944, at *3 (D. Mass.
Oct. 13, 1994) (issuing preliminary injunction and reasoning that "[the employee] could not and
did not leave behind his special knowledge of plaintiff's operation, and in serving his new
employer he will inevitably draw upon that knowledge"); Investors Bank & Trust Co. v. Gunes,
No. 94-2567F, 1994 WL 879800, at *1 -*2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 2, 1994) (finding there was an
immediate threat that a former mutual find employee would use his employer's confidential and
proprietary information for the benefit of his new employer and to the detriment of his former
one because it would be "difficult or impossible" for the employee not to use such information
while working for the competitor).
280. 885 F Supp. 294,297 (D. Mass. 1995).
281. Dulisse v. Park Int'l Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1688, 1691 (N.D. I11. 1998) (citations
omitted).
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information. Some courts may give these declarations some weight.282
However, courts should look beyond these self-serving assurances to
determine whether there is any evidence to indicate contrary intentions."3
When all of the above factors point to an injunction, evidence of
dishonesty or bad faith on the part of the departing employee would be
the icing on the cake in granting an injunction. Where, as in these cases,
a court is being asked to predict whether a person will engage in
misconduct at some future date, absent a looking glass, it is very difficult
to predict.
Misappropriation and misuse [of trade secrets] can rarely be proved by
convincing and direct evidence. In most cases[,] plaintiffs must construct a
web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of
fact may draw inferences which convince him that it is more probable than
not what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place. Against this
often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence there frequently must be
balanced defendants and defendants' witnesses who directly deny
everything.
294
Therefore, the fact that the employee has already demonstrated a
propensity toward dishonesty should make the call a little easier. 5
Where the former employer has evidence that the former employee has
actually taken information with him or her, it can be the smoking gun.28
1. Not Necessary That Employee Took Information
However, it is not necessary that the employee have taken any
confidential documents.87 It could be enough that given these other
282. See, e.g., Cont'l Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 358 (3d Cir.
1980) (reversing grant of injunction where "[t]he trial court appeared to find credible the
testimony that [the employee] did not intend to disclose, and [the new employer] did not intend to
use, any of [the former employer's] confidential information").
283. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 E Supp. 1483, 1477
(W.D.N.C. 1995) ("According to [the former employer] he has no intention of [disclosing the
confidential information] and as of yet there is no evidence to the contrary,").
284. McFarland v. Brier, No. C.A. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. May
13, 1998) (internal citations omitted) (citing Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 E Supp. 806,
814 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
285. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 899 E Supp. at 1483 ("[Courts] refuse to enjoin an employee
from working for its former employer's competitor under the doctrine of 'inevitable discovery'
absent some showing of bad faith, underhanded dealing, or employment by an entity so plainly
lacking comparable technology that misappropriation can be inferred.").
286. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Ind. 1995)
(holding that where a departing employee took the former employer's customer and supplier lists
before joining a competitor, there was a threat of misappropriation).
287. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Intoccia, No. 94-11568-Z, 1994 WL 601944, at *3 (D. Mass.
Oct. 13, 1994) (assuming that even if defendant took no documents, "he could not and did not
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considerations, including similarity of roles, employees will be
influenced by the knowledge they possess of aspects of the former
employer's trade secrets. As one court stated,
[the former employee] does not go with a tabula msa with respect to [the
former employer's] products, ... its customers and other significant
business information. It is difficult to conceive how all this information
stored in [his] memory can be set aside as he applies himself to a
competitor's business and its products. On the contrary, what [the former
employee knows] about [the former employer] is bound to influence what
he does for [the new employer], and to the extent it does, [the former
employer] will be disadvantaged. 28
8
Other courts are also in agreement with this reasoning.89
2. Efforts By New Employer
Another consideration here is.the extent to which the new employer
has taken steps to honor the employee's nondisclosure agreement with
the former employer. Some employers will, for instance, segregate the
employee from any areas of work where he or she may be tempted to rely
upon the former employer's trade secrets.
One court denied an injunction even where the employee knew
trade secrets because (1) the former employee made no effort to take
confidential information with him when he left the employer, (2) the
former employee and his new employer made an arrangement that he
would not violate the noncompetition agreement with the prior employer,
(3) the new employer made known among its senior management the
nature of the former employee's obligations to the previous employer, and
leave behind his special knowledge of plaintiff's operation, and in serving his new employer he
will inevitably draw upon that knowledge").
288. Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 E Supp. 294,297 (D. Mass. 1995).
289. See, e.g., Aetna Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Hug, No. CV 9704799743, 1997 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1781, at *28 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1997) (granting TRO although "[i]t is
unquestionable that [the ex-employee] is a person of unimpeachable integrity whose honesty is
widely respected and admired"); Am. Totalisator Sys., Inc. v. Automatic Totalisators (U.S.A.) Ltd.,
No. Civ. A. No. 5562, 1978 WL 4479, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 1978) (entering preliminary
injunction despite knowledge that defector was a "man of integrity," where ex-employee was
intimately familiar with strategic plans and possessed valuable information); Lumex, Inc. v.
Highsmith, 919 E Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (entering six-month preliminary injunction
where, notwithstanding good intentions, the court found it was inevitable that the former
employee would disclose important trade secrets); Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 E Supp. 1205,
1234 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[E]ven assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful whether the
[former employee] could completely divorce his knowledge of the trade secrets from any ...
work in which he might engage:'); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F Supp. 1443, 1464-65 (M.D.N.C.
1996) (crafting narrow injunction based upon inevitability of disclosure, despite absence of
noncompetition agreement, or concerns regarding ex-employee's candor).
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(4) there was no evidence the former employee needed to disclose
confidential information to fulfill his obligations to his new employer.2"
However, expression of good faith and intent to honor the former
employer's agreements with the new employer is not determinative.
Such measures will not necessarily prevent the inevitable disclosure of
trade secrets and confidential information as the employee pursues his
new role to his own benefit and the benefit of his new employer.29
Even with good faith on the part of the new employer, trade secrets
may be revealed, to the former employer's serious business detriment.
Accordingly, a court, in its discretion, may not give much weight to these
measures.
292
3. No Injunction Without Bad Faith Where No Noncompetition
Agreement Exists
Indeed, it very well may be in this type of litigation, that evidence of
dishonesty or bad faith may be the most important of these factors in
persuading the court to grant an injunction.293 This author proposes that
an injunction should not issue absent a noncompetition agreement unless
there has been a showing of bad faith or evidence of dishonesty.9'
The employer's case is strengthened where it can show that the
employee has already revealed confidential information.9" The employer
could easily argue that a former employee's lack of forthrightness shows
a willingness to use confidential information to advance his or her career.
In one case, for instance, the court reasoned that "[I]f [the former
employee] would misrepresent the truth in order to gain more money
290. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 E Supp. 2d 667, 682 (S.D. id. 1998).
291. Marca4m 885 E Supp. at297.
292. See, e.g., Lurnex, 919 F. Supp. at 631 (discrediting letter to former employer, and a
similar memorandum to its top personnel, assuring them that it did not want to receive or discuss
any of its trade secrets).
293. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 E3d 1262, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that evidence of Redmond's bad faith demonstrated willingness to misuse trade secrets); Sigma
Chem. Co. v. Harris, 586 E Supp. 704, 710-11 (E.D. Mo. 1984) ("[T]he facts that defendant
attempted to mislead plaintiff about his new employment ... and has solicited some of plaintiffs
suppliers ... strongly suggests a threat of harm to plaintiff"); Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos
Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1204-17 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1998) (stating that there was a
high probability of the disclosure of trade secrets where ex-employees demonstrated a
"predatory" intent and one had a "penchant for creating a separate reality and for deliberate
misrepresentation").
294. See Callahan v. ILL. Oil Co., 240 A.2d 411, 411-14 (R.I. 1968) (refusing to enjoin
employee from soliciting former employer's customers absent noncompete clause or a showing of
bad faith).
295. See Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 E2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir. 1984);
DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *5 (N.Y Sup. Ct. Nov. 7,
1997); Novell, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1217.
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through a severance package, he might also find that the temptation to
succeed in his career would be too much for him to ignore the
confidential information he has about plaintiffs' operations." '
4. Nature of the Dishonesty
The nature of the dishonesty is important. It may make a difference
in the analysis if the employer has evidence of the employee actually
disclosing information or putting it to otherwise improper use, versus
evidence that the employee was not completely truthful or candid about
his or her plans to join a competitor.297 The former may be more
persuasive than the latter.
In one case the court denied an injunction pointing out that (1) the
employee did not take with him nor did he have access to the former
employer's written information or material such as designs or blueprints,
and (2) the employee appeared to be an "honest, honorable person who
respects [the former employer's] rights to protect its trade secrets."29"
IX. CHECKLIST OF THE MODEL
As discussed above, whether an injunction should issue on an
inevitable disclosure claim requires findings of a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of the claim and irreparable harm. Based on the
preceding discussion, the analytical model to arrive at such a conclusion
is presented below.
1. Is there a nondisclosure agreement (either as a stand-alone or
as part of another agreement such as a noncompetition
agreement)?
If not, then the case cannot proceed under the doctrine.
2. Is there a valid and enforceable noncompetition agreement?
If so, continue with the balancing test, balancing all remaining
factors, namely, (i) degree of competition, (ii) extent of
296. Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 E Supp. 1443, 1461 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
297. See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 E Supp. 852, 859 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
(treating employee's lying to colleagues about his position with the new employer as mere
"'puffig' to make it seem as if he was getting a better job than he was"); Uncle B's Bakery, Inc.
v. O'Rourke, 920 F Supp. 1405, 1419-20 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (refusing to address conflicting
testimony regarding joining a competitor).
298. Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W2d 468, 474 (Ark 1999); sem also
Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Pankow, 150 S.E.2d 56, 59 (N.C. 1966) (rejecting preliminary injunction
because "[t]he plaintiff has offered no evidence that defendant acquired knowledge of its business
in bad faith.... He has merely exercised the privilege every citizen has of accepting employment
in the field for which he is trained").
[Vol. 7218
2005] FAIRNESS AND THE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
knowledge and exposure, and (iii)evidence of dishonesty or
bad faith.
3. If there is no noncompetition agreement, is there evidence of
dishonesty or bad faith?
If not, no injunction should issue.
If so, continue with the balancing test, balancing all
remaining factors, namely, degree of competition and extent of
knowledge and exposure.
4. Do the totality of the circumstances, after balancing the factors,
weigh in favor of issuing an injunction?
If not, an injunction is denied on the inevitable disclosure
claim.
If so, determine the scope of the injunction. Among the
possible considerations are:
(i) The length of the injunction and terms of the injunction.
(ii) Whether there should be a complete bar against the
employee working for the new employer in any position.
(iii) Whether the employee should be barred from working for
the new employer in a particular role and for a particular
period of time (usually either until the time remaining on
the non-competition agreement expires, or until the trade
secret information known by the employee becomes
stale).
(iv) Whether the former employer will be required to pay the
salary of the former employee for the period of the
injunction.
(v) Whether the former employer will be required to post a
bond, and the amount of such a bond.
X. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
The model presented above should effectively deal with the critics'
concerns, as articulated by one court:
[I]n the absence of a covenant not to compete or a finding of actual or an
intent to disclose trade secrets, employees "may pursue their chosen field
of endeavor in direct competition" with their prior employer. Merely
possessing trade secrets and holding a comparable position with a
competitor does not justify an injunction. A claim of trade secret
219
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misappropriation should not act as an ex post facto covenant not to
compete.2"
At this point we will revisit some of the cases discussed earlier in
this Article to determine how they would fare under this model. Where it
appears a case would have had the same outcome it will receive a "pass"
designation, whereas those where the outcome would have been different
will be designated a "fail."
The model, while new and different from any that have been
proposed, is an effective tool because it helps to achieve balance and
fairness. Unlike what has been proposed by critics of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, the model does not advocate abolishing the use of
the doctrine. Nor does it promote widespread granting of injunctions.
Rather, it presents a format that establishes careful scrutiny of cases
whereby injunctions will be granted only in the most deserving cases.
Indeed, many cases where injunctions were denied will "pass" this
model, meaning that the model would have also recommended denial of
the injunction.
Some, however, will "fail" because of other considerations in the
case, such as competition and similarity, degree of exposure and
knowledge of the trade secrets, and especially if evidence of dishonesty
or bad faith were sufficiently high enough to justify an injunction with or
without a noncompetition agreement. Thus, the model addresses the
concerns of critics and the "haphazard" nature in which the doctrine is
currently applied.
One may find that many decisions are consistent with the model.
That is because most courts already strive to achieve the kind of fairness
and equitable result to which the model aspires. The model makes it
easier to do that; it imposes a common language in the criteria for all
cases, and makes it easier to predict the likelihood of success. Moreover,
the fact that the model is consistent also means that it should be easier to
adopt because it is not so much of a stretch that it would be difficult to
adopt and apply.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine every case,
certain exemplary cases, particularly those identified earlier as being
inconsistent, will be evaluated. The value of the model, however, lies not
in its retrospective analytical benefit, but in its prospective application to
cases that will arise in the future. The retrospective analysis also faces
the limitation that it is confined to facts raised and discussed in the
299. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 E Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992)
(citing E.W Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F2d 1108 (2d Cir 1969)).
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published opinion. Thus, other factors relevant to the model may well be
present in a case but are not adequately reflected in the opinion.
A. Examples of Cases that Pass the Model
These are cases where their outcomes, either in granting or denying,
a preliminary injunction are consistent with the model. That is, the result
would more than likely have been the same, had the model been applied.
1. PepsiCo v Redmond'
Although Redmond did not sign a noncompetition agreement, his
nondisclosure agreement was buttressed by the court's finding that he
could not be trusted."' Moreover, the level of competitiveness between
the two companies along with Redmond's "extensive" knowledge of
PepsiCo's trade secrets justified the issuance of the preliminary
injunction.
2. Ba dlla America, Inc. v Wgh P 2
An injunction was correctly issued in this case even without the
employee having signed the noncompetition agreement and
nondisclosure agreement that were in his employment packet.3" As the
court found, the employee signed that he received and reviewed the
employment manual that contained the plaintiff company's
confidentiality policies.' This, in effect, was the nondisclosure
agreement required under the model. The necessary bad faith was
present, since there was strong evidence that the employee had taken
trade secret information with him."° There were also serious questions
about his credibility."°  Given similarly strong evidence on the
competitiveness and knowledge elements, the injunction was justified
under the model.
3. Rencor Controls and Lawler
The courts in Rencor Controls and Lawler correctly denied
injunctions in these cases where there was neither a noncompetition
300. 54 E3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); see discussion supra Part II.A.
301. PepsiCo, 54 E3d at 1270; see supra Part ll.A (discussing Redmond's credibility).
302. No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002).
303. See id at *4.
304. Id at *5.
305. Seeid at *8.
306. See id at *31.
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agreement nor a nondisclosure agreement in either case."7 Accordingly,
under the model the cases could not proceed as inevitable disclosure
cases. This is so even in the face of some indication that an employee
may have taken the former employer's information with him."8 Although
this result may appear harsh, the model is unforgiving of employers who
neglect to enter into nondisclosure agreements with employees, but later
seek to enjoin them from working for a competitor.
4. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v Dole Food Co30
In Del Monte, assuming the court had been in a jurisdiction that
adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the injunction should not have
issued. Absent a noncompetition agreement, there was no evidence of
bad faith to support the injunction."' Thus, despite the court's wrangling
with whether disclosure was inevitable or merely threatened, the outcome
under the model would have been the same.?
5. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v Lockhart"'
The employee's noncompetition agreement in the Bridgestone/
Firestone case was declared unenforceable by the court. Accordingly,
there was, in effect, no noncompetition agreement. Fortunately the
employee had signed a nondisclosure agreement."3 A finding of the
necessary bad faith element under the model was missing, however.1
Accordingly, even if the other factors under the model had been met
(which they had not), an injunction should not have issued. The court's
denial of the injunction is therefore consistent with the model.
B. Examples of Cases That Fail Under the Model
These are cases where their outcomes are inconsistent with the
model. Had the model been applied to the facts, the outcome would
likely have been different.
307. See Rencor Controls, Inc. v. Stinson, 230 E Supp. 2d 99, 103 (D. Me. 2002); Lawler
Mfg. Co. v. Bradley Corp., No. IP 98-1660-e M/S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14197, at *19 (S.D.
Ind. Apr. 26, 2000); discussion supra Part VH.B.
308. See Rencor, 230 E Supp. 2dat 102; Lawler, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14197, at *42.
309. 148 E Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001); seealsodiscussion supmrPart 1I.C.
310. See Del Monte, 148 E Supp. 2d at 1338; see also discussion supm Part II.C.
311. SeeDelMonte, 148 E Supp. 2dat 1338.
312. 5 F Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. id. 1998).
313. 1d at 671,683-85.
314. See discussion supra Part II.B.7. Note that in some of these cases it just may be that
the evidence of bad faith was not sufficiently developed or litigated by the parties, but this
analysis assumes that failure to discuss such evidence means that there was none.
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1. Marietta Corp. v Fair~hWs"t3 '
Although this court issued an injunction in a case that on the surface
appears very similar to PepsiCo, that outcome is inconsistent with the
model. The key reason (unlike in PepsiCo) is the absence of bad faith or
dishonesty Given that the noncompetition agreement in this case had
expired, there was insufficient evidence of bad faith to bolster the
nondisclosure agreement.' 6 Other than noting that the defendant had
contacted several of plaintiff's customers "to inform them of his new
affiliation and initiate a relationship on behalf of his new employer,"
there was no other evidence of dishonesty or untrustworthiness.'
Accordingly, even if the other elements of the model were met and the
defendant was "privy to a great deal of confidential information in the
course of his employment with plaintiff," an injunction should not have
issued.3"' These discrepancies, in fact, were among the reasons why the
case was reversed on appeal. 9
2. Merck & Co. v Lyon3"
Similarly, the absence of any evidence of bad faith in Merck should
have prevented the issuance of an injunction. Recognizing this missing
element, the court nonetheless found it unnecessary to its balancing:
"when the trade secret [is] clearly established and the possibility of
disclosure high and the value to the competitor great, an injunction
would issue even when there had been no bad faith or underhanded
dealing by the former employee or the competitor.""32 This is at odds with
the model presented here, which requires bad faith where there is no
noncompetition agreement and only a nondisclosure agreement.
3. DoubleClick, Inc. v Henderson.2
In DoubleClick, there was evidence of bad faith and indeed actual
misappropriation by the former employees.23 However, an injunction
315. No. 37265, 2002 WL 31056732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 23, 2002), revb 754 N.Y.S.2d
62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); see discussion supra Part I.B.4.
316. See Matietta, 2002 WL 31056732, at *3.
317. Seeidat*5,*9.
318. See id. at *6-*7.
319. See Maietta 754 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
320. 941 F Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996); see discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
321. Merck, 941 E Supp. at 1460 (citing Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E. 2d 478,
485 (N.C. App. Ct. 1996)).
322. No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997); seediscussion supra
Part I1.B.2.
323. See Double Click, 1997 WL 731413, at *4-*6.
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should not have issued because apart from having not signed a
noncompetition agreement, the employees had no nondisclosure
agreement with the plaintiff either.32 Thus, under the model, the case
should not have proceeded under the inevitable disclosure analysis
without a nondisclosure agreement.
It may be that in granting the injunction the court was swayed by the
special circumstances surrounding the nondisclosure agreements-the
defendants had signed nondisclosure agreements with a predecessor
company, which did not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff as the
successor company." However, the court made clear that the defendants
had not signed nondisclosure agreements with the plaintiff company.2'
The court, nevertheless, perhaps persuaded by the other strong factors in
the case such as the employees' actual misappropriation and their
"cavalier attitude" toward the plaintiff's trade secrets, issued the
injunction.32 The court also relied upon the employees' common law
duty not to divulge their employer's trade secrets."' The model takes a
less tolerant approach when the employer did not insist upon the signing
of a nondisclosure agreement.!
XI. GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE MODEL
A. Civil Procedure--Preliminary Injuncion Cases
The model presented herein applies to a broader concern about
preliminary injunction cases in general, not just inevitable disclosure
cases. While all preliminary injunction cases are already subject to the
preliminary injunction standard, that standard leaves a wide open hole as
to how it is applied from case to case. Thus, for instance, whether a
litigant has demonstrated "likelihood of success on the merits" or
"irreparable harm" in a particular type of case depends on the facts of
that case. What one judge may deem a "substantial likelihood" another
may not.
This raises two issues: (1) whether uniformity in the results of
similar types of cases decided on preliminary injunction is desirable, and
(2) if so, then how can it be achieved. Inevitable disclosure cases and the
324. See id at *2, *4 n.2.
325. Seeid. at *4 n.2.
326. Id
327. See id. at *6-*8.
328. See id at *4 n.2, *6.
329. In circumstances, as in DoubleClick where there is evidence of actual use but no
nondisclosure agreement, the employer is not without recourse. Indeed, there is probably a viable
actual misappropriation claim, but not an inevitability case under the model.
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strong criticism surrounding the inevitable disclosure doctrine answer the
first question in the affirmative. Indeed, it is the inconsistency and
unpredictability in case outcomes, coupled with a perception of
unfairness that demonstrate the need for uniformity. This desire for
uniformity should be just as strong whether the preliminary injunction
ruling is a First Amendment issue or a land use action.
The kind of model presented here, with few and definite factors,
changes the fundamental nature by which a preliminary injunction
decision is rendered. In essence, it imposes a standard upon or within
another standard. Where the approach is to take each case as it comes,
and examine it solely based on its facts and merits, the decision is more
like a factual determination. Given that preliminary injunction cases
tend to be very fact intensive, then a ruling on the merits of a case will be
based on individualized factors. These include the particular court, the
facts of the case, the application of the law to the particular facts, the
jurisdiction, and ultimately the judge's discretion. The end result is that
three similar cases in three different courts may have three possibly
inconsistent outcomes.
A model of few and definite factors, however, imposed on every
case of a particular kind, makes the decision more like a decision as a
matter of law. It imposes a uniform structure that is applied across the
board, regardless of the court or the jurisdiction, to determine an
outcome. The case either meets the criteria in the model or it does not. It
guides and in some ways limits judicial discretion because three judges
in three different courts, using the same formula to determine "likelihood
of success on the merits," are more likely to have consistent rulings.
Aside from the benefit to judges, both at the trial level and the
appellate level, it is advantageous to parties and their counsel. Attorneys,
even before filing cases, can better advise their clients about likely case
outcomes by applying the model to the case at hand. Thus, rather than
shooting in the dark and hoping for the best, there are more objective
indicators of likely case outcomes. Case law research on the outcome of
preliminary injunction cases in the particular area will likely reveal fewer
inconsistencies, resulting in higher predictability. It would also allow
counsel to better assess the strengths and weaknesses of their particular
cases. All this leads to greater economy and efficiency in the litigation
marketplace.
B. Other Cases-Union ofFlexibili(y with Rgidi(y
The model presented here is also similar to the balancing utilized by
courts in analyzing some constitutional law issues. In the Fourth
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Amendment context, for instance, there is a weighing of the
government's interests against the individual's interest. Although this
kind of balancing is sometimes criticized for allowing judges to
implement their subjective value judgments, balancing in this type of
model is no more subjective than other analytical methods.3 That is
because the specific guidelines and factors to be weighed define and set
the boundaries rather than leaving them to chance or the particular
judge's discretion. This provides the flexibility to work with the facts of
the individual case while providing the more rigid framework through
which they should be filtered.
XI. CONCLUSION
The inevitable disclosure doctrine is important in that it has far
reaching applications. It covers employment law, trade secret law, and
the law of unfair competition. It is perhaps because of its powerful reach
and potential consequences that it has become a hot topic, garnering
more critics than supporters. However, a careful look at the criticism of
the doctrine reveals that it is the application of the doctrine by courts
across the country, rather than the doctrine itself, that seems to be in
disfavor.
As currently applied, its application is perceived to be unfair. This
is especially so when an employee is enjoined from working for a
competitor without having signed a noncompetition agreement.
However, this is hardly reason enough to abolish the doctrine. Rather,
the challenge is to make its application more consistent, predictable, and
ultimately fairer. That is what the proposed model aspires to accomplish.
On a general level it is similar to the analysis involved in determining
whether a noncompetition agreement should be enforced. It presents
parameters to determine reasonableness. When these parameters are
applied uniformly, the decision of whether to issue an injunction should
be more fair and consistent.
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